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a b s t r a c t 
Description Logics (DLs) under Rational Closure (RC) is a well-known framework for non- 
monotonic reasoning in DLs. In this paper, we address the concept subsumption decision 
problem under RC for nominal safe ELO ⊥ , a notable and practically important DL rep- 
resentative of the OWL 2 proﬁle OWL 2 EL. Our contribution here is to deﬁne a polyno- 
mial time subsumption procedure for nominal safe ELO ⊥ under RC that relies entirely on 
a series of classical, monotonic EL ⊥ subsumption tests. Therefore, any existing classical 
monotonic EL ⊥ reasoner can be used as a black box to implement our method. We then 
also adapt the method to one of the known extensions of RC for DLs, namely Defeasible 
Inheritance-based DLs without losing the computational tractability. 
© 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1. Introduction 
Description logics (DLs) provide the logical foundation of formal ontologies of the OWL family. 1 Among the various ex-
tensions proposed to enhance the representational capabilities of DLs, endowing them with non-monotonic features is still
a main issue, as documented by the past 20 years of technical development (see e.g. [8,20,27,47] and references therein, and
Section 6 ). 
We recall that a typical problem that can be addressed using non-monotonic formalisms is reasoning with ontologies in
which some classes are exceptional w.r.t. some properties of their super classes. 
Example 1. We know that avian red blood cells , mammalian red blood cells , and hence also bovine red blood cells are vertebrate
red blood cells , and that vertebrate red blood cells normally have a cell membrane . We also know that vertebrate red blood
cells normally have a nucleus , but that mammalian red blood cells normally don’t. 
A classical formalisation of the ontology above would imply that mammalian red blood cells do not exist, since, being a
subclass of vertebrate red blood cells, they would have a nucleus, but in the meantime, they are an atypical subclass that
does not have a nucleus. Therefore, mammalian red blood cells would and would not have a nucleus at the same time.
Unlike a classical approach, the use of a non-monotonic formalism may allow us to deal with such exceptional classes. 
Among the various proposals to inject non-monotonicity into DLs, the preferential approach has recently gained atten-
tion [10,12–17,22,26,28–30,46] as it is based on one of the major frameworks for non-monotonic reasoning in the proposi-∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail addresses: giovanni.casini@uni.lu (G. Casini), umberto.straccia@isti.cnr.it (U. Straccia), tmeyer@cs.uct.ac.za (T. Meyer). 
1 https://www.w3.org/TR/owl2-overview/ 
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 tional case, namely the KLM approach [37] . One of the main constructions in the preferential approach is Rational Closure
(RC) [40] . RC has some interesting properties: the conclusions are intuitive, and the decision procedure can be reduced
to a series of classical decision problems, sometimes preserving the computational complexity of the underlying classical
decision problem. 
In this paper, we address the concept subsumption decision problem under RC for nominal safe ELO ⊥ [35] , a computa-
tionally tractable and practically important DL representative of the OWL 2 proﬁle OWL 2 EL. 2 In fact, (i) nominal safe ELO ⊥
is the language EL [3] , extended with the bottom concept (denoted ⊥ ) and with the so-called ObjectHasValue construct
(also denoted as B in the DL literature), which is an existential quantiﬁcation. Roughly, nominal safe ELO ⊥ is as ELO ⊥ , 
except for the fact that a nominal may only occur in concept expressions of the form ∃ r .{ a }, or in inclusion axioms of the
form { a }  C , stating that individual a is an instance of concept C (note that so-called role assertions can be also expressed
via { a } ∃ r .{ b }); and (ii) in [35] it is shown that many OWL EL ontologies are nominal safe and that an EL ⊥ reasoner is
suﬃcient to decide the subsumption problem, decreasing the inference time signiﬁcantly in practice. 
In summary, our contributions are as follows. 
1. We describe a subsumption decision procedure under RC for nominal safe ELO ⊥ that runs in polynomial time. Al feature
of our approach is that our procedure relies entirely on a series of classical, monotonic EL ⊥ subsumption tests, and, thus,
any existing EL ⊥ reasoner can be used as a black box to implement our method. Note that e.g., in [12] it is shown that
the use of a DL reasoners as a black box for RC under ALC is scalable in practice. We conjecture that this property holds
with respect to RC under nominal safe ELO ⊥ as well. 
2. We will also illustrate how to adapt our procedure to a relevant modiﬁcation of RC for DLs, namely Defeasible
Inheritance-based DLs [14] . We recall that Defeasible Inheritance-based DLs have been introduced to overcome some
inference limitations of RC [13] : in fact, in [14, Appendix A] it is shown that Defeasible Inheritance-based DLs behave
better than RC w.r.t. most of the “benchmark” examples illustrated there. A feature of our proposed procedure is that it
runs in polynomial time and maintains the advantage of the previous point. 
In the following, we will proceed as follows: for the sake of completeness, Section 2 introduces nominal safe ELO ⊥ and
recaps salient notions about Rational Closure for ALC [12,13,46] ; Section 3 we describe a polynomial time procedure to
decide subsumption under RC for defeasible EL ⊥ ; in Section 4 , we adapt our procedure for the Defeasible Inheritance-
based ELO ⊥ . In Section 5 we address nominal safe ELO ⊥ and show how we polynomially reduce reasoning within it to
defeasible EL ⊥ , and thus inherit the computational complexity of reasoning of the subsumption decision problem from
defeasible EL ⊥ and its RC extensions. Section 6 discusses related work and Section 7 concludes and addresses future work.
All relevant proofs are in the appendixes. 3 
2. Preliminaries 
To make the paper self-contained, in the following we brieﬂy present the DLs EL ⊥ , ELO ⊥ , and nominal safe ELO ⊥ , 
and an exponential time procedure to decide subsumption in the DL ALC under RC via series of classical ALC subsump-
tion tests. The latter is important here as we will adapt it to decide the subsumption problem for nominal safe ELO ⊥ in
polynomial time. 
2.1. The DLs EL ⊥ , ELO ⊥ , and nominal safe ELO ⊥ 
EL ⊥ is the DL EL with the addition of the empty concept ⊥ [3] . It is a proper sublanguage of ALC . Note that con-
sidering EL alone would not make sense in our case as EL ontologies are always concept-satisﬁable, while the notion of
defeasible reasoning is built over a notion of conﬂict (see Example 1 ) which needs to be expressible in the language. 
ELO ⊥ is EL ⊥ extended with so-called nominal concepts (denoted with the letter O in the DL literature, while nominal
safe ELO ⊥ is ELO ⊥ with some restrictions on the occurrence of nominals. 
Syntax The vocabulary is given by a set of atomic concepts N C = { A 1 , . . . , A n } , a set of atomic roles N R = { r 1 , . . . , r m } 
and a set of individuals N O = { a, b, c, . . . } . All these sets are assumed to be ﬁnite. ELO ⊥ concept expressions C, D, . . . are
built according to the following syntax: 
C, D → A |  | ⊥ | C  D | ∃ r.C | { a } . 
An ontology T (or TBox , or knowledge base ) is a ﬁnite set of Generalised Concept Inclusion (GCI) axioms C  D ( C is subsumed
by D ), meaning that all the objects in the concept C are also in the concept D . We use the expression C = D as shorthand
for having both C  D and D  C . 
The DL EL ⊥ A concept of the form { a } is called a nominal . EL ⊥ is ELO ⊥ without nominals. 
The DL nominal safe ELO ⊥ Nominal safe ELO ⊥ is ELO ⊥ with some restrictions on the occurrence of nominals and is
deﬁned as follows [35] . An ELO ⊥ concept C is safe if C has only occurrences of nominals in subconcepts of the form ∃ r .{ a };2 https://www.w3.org/TR/owl2-proﬁles/ 
3 A preliminary version of some results in Sections 3 and 4 appear in the Technical Report [18] . 
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 C is negatively safe (in short, n-safe ) if C is either safe or a nominal. A GCI C  D is safe if C is n-safe and D is safe. An ELO ⊥
ontology is nominal safe if all its GCIs are safe. It is worth noting that nominal safeness is a quite commonly used pattern
of nominals in OWL EL ontologies, as reported in [35] . Semantics An interpretation is a pair I = 〈 I , ·I 〉 , where I is a
non-empty set, called interpretation domain and ·I is an interpretation function that 
1. maps atomic concepts A into a set A I ⊆ I ; 
2. maps  (resp. ⊥ ) into a set  I = I (resp. ⊥ I = ∅ ); 
3. maps roles r into a set r I ⊆ I × I ; 
4. maps individuals a ∈ N O into an object a I ∈ I . 
The interpretation function ·I is extended to complex concept expressions as follows: 
(C  D ) I = C I ∩ D I 
(∃ r.C) I = { o ∈ I | ∃ o ′ ∈ I s. t. 〈 o, o ′ 〉 ∈ r I and o ′ ∈ C I } 
{ a } I = { a I } . 
An interpretation I satisﬁes (is a model of) C  D if C I ⊆ D I , denoted I | C  D . I satisﬁes (is a model of) an ontology T 
if it satisﬁes each axiom in it. An axiom α is entailed by a T if every model of T is a model of α, denoted as T | α . 
Remark 1. Note that a so-called concept assertion a : C ( a is an instance of concept C ) and a role assertion ( a , b ): r ( a and b are
related via role r ) can easily be represented in nominal safe ELO ⊥ via the mapping a : C → { a }  C and ( a , b ): r → { a } ∃ r .{ b }. 
In the following, we recap here some salient facts related to nominal safe ELO ⊥ [35, Appendix A] , which we will use
once we present our entailment decision algorithm for nominal safe ELO ⊥ . Speciﬁcally, we can replace nominals in a
nominal safe ELO ⊥ ontology T with newly introduced concept names, yielding an EL ⊥ ontology T ′ , such that T ′ 
supports the same entailments as T [35] . Hence, an entailment decision procedure for EL ⊥ suﬃces to decide entailment
for nominal safe ELO ⊥ (but not for unrestricted ELO ⊥ ). 
Consider an ELO ⊥ ontology T . For each individual a occurring in T consider a new atomic concept N a . For X an ELO ⊥ 
concept, GCI, or ontology, we deﬁne N ( X ) to be the result of replacing each occurrence of each nominal { a } in X with N a .
The following proposition provides a suﬃcient condition to check entailment. 
Proposition 1 ( [35] , Lemma 5 and Corollary 2) . Let T be an ELO ⊥ ontology and α an ELO ⊥ axiom that do not contain atomic
concepts of the form N a . Then 
1. if N(T ) | N(α) then T | α ; 
2. if N(T ) | N a  ⊥ for some a then T is not satisﬁable. 
The converse of Proposition 1 does not hold in general but holds for nominal safe ELO ⊥ . 
Proposition 2 ( [35] , Theorem 4) . Let T be a nominal safe ELO ⊥ ontology and α a safe ELO ⊥ axiom that do not contain
atomic concepts of the form N a . Then 
1. if N(T ) | N a  ⊥ for all a then T is satisﬁable; 
2. if T | α then N (T ) | N (α) . 
Note that Proposition 2 fails if the use of nominals is not safe. 
Example 2 ( [35] , Remark 2) . Consider 
T = { A  { a } , B  { a } , A  ∃ r.B } . 
It is easily veriﬁed that T is satisﬁable and that T | A  B . However, for 
N(T ) = { A  N a , B  N a , A  ∃ r.B } 
we have that N(T ) is satisﬁable, N(A  B ) = A  B, but N(T ) | A  B . 
2.2. Rational Closure in ALC 
We brieﬂy recap RC for the DL ALC (see, e.g. [12] ), which in turn is based on its original formulation for Propositional
Logic [40] . 
The DL ALC is the DL EL ⊥ extended with concept negation, i.e. concept expressions of the form ¬C and semantics
(¬ C ) I = I \ C I . Note that by using the negation ¬ and the conjunction  we can introduce also, e.g. the disjunction ,
i.e. C D is a macro for ¬( ¬C ¬D ), that is, it is interpreted as (C unionsq D ) I = C I ∪ D I . 
A defeasible GCI axiom is of the form C  ∼ D, that is read as ‘Typically, an instance of C is also an instance of D ’. We
extend ontologies with a DBox D, i.e. a ﬁnite set of defeasible GCIs and denote an ontology as K = 〈T , D〉 , where T is a
TBox and D is a DBox. 
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 Example 3. We can formalise the information in Example 1 in EL ⊥ and, thus, in ALC with the following ontology K =
〈T , D〉 , with 4 
T = { BRBC  MRBC , 
ARBC  VRBC , 
MRBC  VRBC , 
∃ hasN .   NotN  ⊥ } 
D = { VRBC  ∼∃ hasCM .  , 
VRBC 
 ∼∃ hasN .  , 
MRBC 
 ∼NotN } . 
Given a KB K = 〈T , D〉 , RC satisﬁes some basic desiderata: the axioms in T and D are included into the set of the
derivable axioms, that moreover is closed under the following properties. 
Reﬂexivity (Ref), Left Logical Equivalence (LLE), Right Conjunction (And), Left Disjunction (Or), and Right Weakening (RW)
are all properties that correspond to well-known properties of the classical subsumption relation  . Cautious Monotonicity
(CM) and Rational Monotonicity (RM) are constrained forms of Monotonicity that are useful and desirable in modelling
defeasible reasoning. (CM) guarantees that our inferences are cumulative, that is, whatever we can conclude about typical
C s (e.g. that they are in D ), we can add such information to C ( C D ) and still derive all the information associated to typical
C s ( C  D  ∼E ). The stronger principle (RM) is necessary to model the principle of presumption of typicality , that is, if the
typical elements of a class C satisfy certain properties (e.g. E ) and we are not informed that the typical elements of C do
not satisfy the properties of D ( ), then we can assume that the typical elements of C D satisfy all the properties
characterising the typical elements of C ( C  D  ∼E ). We refer to [37,45] for a deeper explanation of the meaning of such
properties and why they are desirable for modelling defeasible reasoning. 
RC is a form of inferential closure that satisﬁes all the properties above; it is based on the semantic notion of ranked
interpretation and on the directly connected notion of ranked entailment, which we illustrate next. 
Deﬁnition 1 (Ranked interpretation) . A ranked interpretation is a triple R = 〈 R , ·R , ≺R 〉 , where R and · R are as in the
classical DL interpretations, while ≺R is a modular preference relation over R , that is, a strict partial order satisfying the
following property: 
Modularity ≺R is modular if and only if there is a ranking function rk : R −→ N s.t. for every o , p ∈ R , o ≺R p iff
rk ( o ) < rk ( p ). 
In the deﬁnition above, o ≺R p means that the object o is considered more typical than the object p . The order ≺R allows
us to partition the domain R of a ranked interpretation R into a sequence of layers , 〈 L R 0 , . . . , L R n , . . . 〉 where for every object
o , o ∈ L R 
0 
iff o ∈ min ≺R (R ) and o ∈ L R i +1 iff o ∈ min ≺R (R \ 
⋃ 
0 ≤ j≤i L R j ) . 
5 From this partition, we can deﬁne the height of an
individual a as 
h R (a ) = i iff a R ∈ L R i . 
The lower the height, the more typical the individual in the interpretation is taken to be. We can also extend this to a level
of typicality for concepts: the height of a concept C in an interpretation R , h R ( C ), as the lowest (most typical) layer in which
the concept’s extension is non-empty, i.e., 
h R (C) = min { i | (C R ) ∩ L R  = ∅} . i 
4 The acronyms stand for: BRBC - Bovine Red Blood Cells; MRBC - Mammalian Red Blood Cells; ARBC - Avian Red Blood Cells; VRBC - Vertebrate Red 
Blood Cells; hasN - has Nucleus; hasCM - has Cell Membrane. 
5 Given a set X and the order ≺ deﬁned over X , min ≺(X ) = { x ∈ X | ∃ y ∈ X s.t. y ≺ x } 
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 If in a model R there is no individual satisfying a concept C , we set h R (C) = ∞ . 
Deﬁnition 2 (Ranked model) . An interpretation R = 〈 R , ·R , ≺R 〉 satisﬁes (is a model of ) C  D (denoted R C  D ) iff C R ⊆D R ,
and satisﬁes (is a model of ) C 
 ∼D iff min ≺R (C R ) ⊆ D R (denoted R | C  ∼D ). R satisﬁes (is a model of ) K = 〈T , D〉 iff R α for
all axioms α ∈ T ∪ D . 
Hence, C 
 ∼D is satisﬁed by R iff all the most typical individuals in C R are also in D R . We say that two ontologies are rank
equivalent iff they are satisﬁed by exactly the same ranked models, and that an ontology is rank satisﬁable iff there is at
least a ranked model that satisﬁes it. 
Remark 2. Note that from the above deﬁnition of the satisﬁability of an axiom C 
 ∼D we obtain the following correspon-
dence: for every ranked model R , 
R | C  ⊥ iff R | C  ∼⊥ . 
This allows for the translation of every classical axiom C  D into a defeasible axiom C  ¬ D  ∼⊥ . Note also that such a
translation is not feasible in ELO ⊥ , as ¬ is not supported in EL ⊥ . 
Now, the deﬁnition of ranked entailment follows directly from the notion of a ranked model. So, let R K be the class of
the ranked models of an ontology K . 
Deﬁnition 3 (Ranked Entailment) . Given an ontology K = 〈T , D〉 and a defeasible axiom C  ∼D, K rationally entails C  ∼D 
(denoted K |R C  ∼D ) iff ∀ R ∈ R K , R | C  ∼D . 
The main drawbacks of ranked entailment are that it is too weak from the inferential point of view and does not sat-
isfy the(RM) property [12,40] . RC is a kind of entailment that extends Ranked Entailment, allowing us to overcome these
limitations. It is based on a notion of exceptionality that is built on Ranked Entailment. 
Deﬁnition 4 (Exceptionality) . A concept C is exceptional w.r.t. an ontology K = 〈T , D〉 iff K |R   ∼¬ C . That is to say, C is
exceptional w.r.t. K iff, for every ranked model R ∈ R K , 
C R ∩ min 
≺R 
(R ) = ∅ . 
An axiom C 
 ∼D is exceptional w.r.t. K iff C is exceptional. 
Intuitively, a concept is exceptional w.r.t. an ontology iff it is not possible to have it satisﬁed by any typical individual (i.e.,
an individual in the layer 0, that corresponds to min ≺R (
R ) ) in any ranked model of the ontology. Iteratively applied, the
notion of exceptionality allows to associate to every concept C a rank value w.r.t. an ontology K = 〈T , D〉 in the following
way (called RC ranking procedure ). 
1. A concept C has rank 0 ( r K (C) = 0 ) iff it is not exceptional w.r.t. K (that is, h R (C) = 0 for some model R of K ). In this
case we set r K (C 
 ∼D ) = 0 for every defeasible axiom having C as antecedent. The set of the axioms in D with rank 0 is
denoted as D 0 . 
2. For i > 0, C has rank i iff it does not have rank i − 1 and it is not exceptional wrt K i = 〈T , D \ ⋃ i −1 j=0 D j 〉 . If r K (C) = i, 
then we set r K (C 
 ∼D ) = i . The set of the axioms in D with rank i is denoted as D i . 
3. By iterating the previous step a ﬁnite number of times, we ﬁnally reach a (possibly empty) subset E ⊆ D s.t. all the
axioms in E are exceptional w.r.t. 〈T , E〉 . 6 If E  = ∅ we deﬁne the rank value of the axioms in E as ∞ , and the set E 
is denoted as D ∞ . 
As a consequence, according to the procedure above, D can be partitioned into a ﬁnite sequence 〈D 0 , . . . , D n , D ∞ 〉 
( n ≥0), where D ∞ may be possibly empty. This semantic procedure allows us to give a rank value to every concept and
every defeasible subsumption. Using the rank values, we can deﬁne the notion of RC as follows: 
Deﬁnition 5 (Rational Closure) . C 
 ∼D is in the RC of an ontology K iff
r K (C  D ) < r K (C  ¬ D ) or r K (C) = ∞ . 
Informally, the above deﬁnition says that C 
 ∼D is in the rational closure of K if the most typical instances of C happen
to be all instances of C D , and not of C ¬D . 
Given an ontology K = 〈T , D〉 , distinct ways of deﬁning models of K characterising its RC can be found in [12] (sum-
marised also here in Appendix A and presented also in [46, Section 4.1] ) and in [29] . Both such kinds of models can be
described as minimal models of the ontology 〈T , D〉 . Paraphrasing Deﬁnition 23 in [29] , we can deﬁne a preference relation
< among ranked interpretations in the following way. 
6 Since D is ﬁnite, we must reach such a point. 
G. Casini et al. / Information Sciences 501 (2019) 588–620 593 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 1
Step 1
 
 Deﬁnition 6 ( [29] , Deﬁnition 23) . Let R = 〈 R , ·R , ≺R 〉 and R ′ = 〈 R ′ , ·R ′ , ≺R ′ 〉 be two ranked interpretations s.t. R = R ′ 
and C R = C R ′ for every concept C . R is preferred to R ′ ( R < R ′ ) iff for every x ∈ R , h R (x ) ≤ h R ′ (x ) , and there is a y ∈ R s.t.
h R (y ) < h R ′ (y ) . An interpretation R is minimal w.r.t. an ontology K if it is a model of K and there is no model R ′ of K s.t.
R ′ < R . 
The reason behind the use of minimal models in characterising RC is in the direct connection between minimality and
the presumption of typicality : in minimal models we maximise the amount of typicality for each individual in the domain,
modulo the satisfaction of the ontology. We will go back to the role of minimality in Section 5 . 
The type of reasoning we are primarily interested in modelling is subsumption checking in ALC under RC, that is,
deciding whether a defeasible subsumption C 
 ∼D is or is not a consequence under RC of an ontology 〈T , D〉 . In [12] a
detailed decision procedure for subsumption checking in ALC under RC is described, which we recap here. 7 This will be
useful, as our subsumption decision procedure for defeasible EL ⊥ will be a variant of it. The key step in translating the
semantic procedure into a correspondent one, based on classical ALC decision steps, is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 3. For every concept C and every ontology K = 〈T , D〉 , if 
T | {¬ E unionsq F | E  ∼F ∈ D}  ¬ C (1)
then C is exceptional w.r.t. K . 
By Proposition 3 , checking exceptionality can be done by using a classical DL reasoner for ALC . Now, consider an ALC
defeasible ontology K = 〈T , D〉 and a defeasible GCI C  ∼D . In order to decide whether C  ∼D is in the RC of an ontology
K, we perform two steps: the ﬁrst one is a ranking procedure, that transforms the initial ontology K = 〈T , D〉 into a rank
equivalent ontology K • = 〈T •, D •〉 , where D • is partitioned into a sequence D •0 , . . . , D •n , with each D •i containing the
defeasible axioms with rank i ; the second one uses K • to decide whether an axiom C  ∼D is in the RC of K . 
Speciﬁcally, deﬁne the function e that, given any ontology 〈T ′ , D ′ 〉 , returns exceptional axioms as 
e (T ′ , D ′ ) = { C  ∼D ∈ D ′ | T ′ | {¬ E unionsq F | E  ∼F ∈ D ′ }  ¬ C} . (2)
The function e gives back axioms in D ′ that are exceptional w.r.t. 〈T ′ , D ′ 〉 (see also [12, Section 6] ). 
Now in order to decide whether C 
 ∼D is in the RC of K, we execute the following two steps shown below, which
we will call RC.Step 1 and RC.Step 2 . Note that RC.Step 1 will correspond to procedure ComputeRanking , while RC.Step
2 is encoded in procedure RationalClosure , both presented in Section 3 later on. Also, the execution of RC.Step 1 , i.e.,
procedure ComputeRanking , can be followed e.g. in Example 4 ), which also illustrates why Steps 1.1 and 1.2 may need to be
repeated more than once to extract all the needed information. 
RC.Step 1 Let T 0 = T , D D 0 = D and i = 0 . Repeat Steps 1.1 and 1.2 until D ∞ 
i 
= ∅ . 
.1 Given 〈T i , D i 〉 , construct the sequence E 0 , E 1 , . . . 
E 0 = D i 
E j+1 = e (T i , E j ) . 
Since D i is ﬁnite, the iteration will terminate with (a possibly empty) ﬁxed-point of e (T i , ·) . 
.2 For a defeasible GCI E 
 ∼F ∈ D i , deﬁne the rank of E  ∼F and of concept E as 
r i (E 
 ∼F ) = 
⎧ ⎨ 
⎩ 
j if E 
 ∼F ∈ E j and E  ∼F ∈ E j+1 
∞ if E  ∼F ∈ E j for all j 
r i (E) = r i (E  ∼F ) . 
Deﬁne 
D i j = { E  ∼F ∈ D i | r i (E  ∼F ) = j} . 
It follows that D i is partitioned into sets D i 
0 
, . . . , D i m , D i ∞ , for some m , with D i ∞ possibly empty. Finally, deﬁne 
T i +1 = T i ∪ { E  ⊥ | E  ∼F ∈ D i ∞ } 
D i +1 = D i \ D i ∞ . 
RC.Step 1 terminates after building a sequence of ontologies 〈T 0 , D 0 〉 , . . . , 〈T k , D k 〉 and ranking functions r 0 , . . . , r k , for
some k ≤ |D| , once we reach the point where D k ∞ = ∅ . Let r k partition D k into D k 1 , . . . , D k n for some n . Furthermore, let
T • = T k , D • = D k , and D •
i 
= D k 
i 
for every 0 ≤ i ≤n . 
Once we have applied RC.Step 1 , Proposition 3 holds also in the opposite direction. 7 The procedure is based on the one by Casini and Straccia [13] and paired with a proper semantics; the latter needed to be modiﬁed slightly since it 
does not always give back the expected result in case D r ∞  = ∅ . The procedure presented in [12] have been presented (and peer-reviewed) also in [46] . 
594 G. Casini et al. / Information Sciences 501 (2019) 588–620 
 
Step 2
Step 2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Proposition 4. Given an ontology K • = 〈T •, D •〉 , obtained from the application of RC.Step1 to an ontology K = 〈T , D〉 , then
for every concept C , 
T • | {¬ E unionsq F | E  ∼F ∈ D •}  ¬ C 
if and only if C is exceptional w.r.t. K • . 
RC.Step 2 So, let T • = T k , D • = D k , r • = r k , and D • be partitioned into D •
0 
, . . . , D •n . 
.1 For 0 ≤ i ≤n deﬁne the concept 
H i = {¬ E unionsq F | E  ∼F ∈ D •i ∪ . . . ∪ D •n } . 
Note that if j < i then H j  H i . 
.2 Finally, given C 
 ∼D, let H C be the ﬁrst concept H i of the sequence H 0 , . . . , H n such that T • | H i  ¬ C . If there is no such
H i let H C be  . Then, we say that C  ∼D is derivable from K iff T • | C  H C  D . 
C  D is derivable from K iff T • | C  ¬ D  ∼⊥ (see Remark 2 ). 
With K  rc C  ∼D (resp. K  rc C  D ) we will denote that C  ∼D (resp. C  D ) is derivable from K via RC.Step 2 . In [12,46] it
is shown that RC.Step 1 is correct w.r.t. the semantic deﬁnition of ranking, and that RC.Step 2 is correct w.r.t. the semantic
deﬁnition of RC ( Deﬁnition 5 ). That is, respectively, 
Proposition 5 ( [12] , Proposition 7) . Given an ontology K = 〈T , D〉 and a concept C , then r K (C) = r •(C) holds. 
Proposition 6 ( [12] , Theorem 5) . Given an ontology K = 〈T , D〉 , and concepts C , D , then C  ∼D is in the RC of K iff K  rc C  ∼D
. 
Remark 3. Note that an indispensable requirement of the above described defeasible subsumption procedure for ALC under
RC is to have a classical DL subsumption decision procedure supporting the empty concept, concept conjunction, negation
and disjunction. 
From [12] , the following propositions are immediate. 
Proposition 7. A classical GCI C  D is in the RC of K = 〈T , D〉 iff T • | C  D, where T • has been computed using RC.Step 1 .
Corollary 8 ( [12] , Corollary 2) . An ontology K = 〈T , D〉 does not have a ranked model iff T • |   ⊥ , where T • has been
computed using RC.Step 1 . 
3. Rational closure in EL ⊥ 
We now present a subsumption decision procedure under RC for EL ⊥ by adapting the procedure for ALC under RC to
EL ⊥ . By Remark 3 , as EL ⊥ does not support concept negation and disjunction, the main problem we have to address is to
ﬁnd a way to overcome this limitation. Concretely, we will deﬁne alternative ways both to 
1. express whether an EL ⊥ concept is exceptional using a classical EL ⊥ subsumption problem only; 
2. express the subsumption problems in Steps 2.1 and 2.2 above in terms of EL ⊥ subsumption problems only. 
3.1. A Subsumption Decision Procedure for EL ⊥ under RC 
Consider a defeasible EL ⊥ ontology K = 〈T , D〉 . As for ALC , we will deﬁne two procedures. The ﬁrst one is a ranking
procedure that transforms the initial ontology K = 〈T , D〉 into a rank equivalent ontology K ∗ = 〈T ∗, D ∗〉 , where D ∗ is
partitioned into a sequence D 0 , . . . , D n , with each D i containing the defeasible axioms with rank i . The second one uses
K ∗ to decide whether an axiom C  ∼D is in the RC of K . The Ranking Procedure Given an ontology 〈T , D〉 , the ranking
procedure is deﬁned by means of two procedures: one for ﬁnding exceptional axioms and one for determining the rank
value of axioms, as deﬁned in Section 2.2 . 
In the following, given an ontology 〈T , E〉 , and a new atomic concept δE (with E indicating a set of defeasible sub-
sumptions), we deﬁne T δE as 
T δE = T ∪ { E  δE  F | E  ∼F ∈ E} . (3)
Informally, we introduce the atom δE as a way of representing the information that characterises the lowest rank. Hence,
its introduction is aimed at the formalisation of the typicality of the lowest layer: C  δE is introduced to represent the
individuals in C that are in the lowest layer. 
Remark 4. The aim of the deﬁnition for T δE is to replace the ALC subsumption test in Proposition 3 with the EL ⊥ sub-
sumption test 
T δ | C  δD  ⊥ , D 
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 for an ontology 〈T , D〉 . 
We obtain an analogue of Proposition 3 . 
Proposition 9. For every concept C and every ontology K = 〈T , D〉 , if 
T δD | C  δD  ⊥ , (4)
where δD is a new atomic concept, then C is exceptional w.r.t. K . 
Procedure Exceptional illustrates how to compute the exceptional axioms. 
Procedure: Exceptional( T , E ) 
Input : T and E ⊆ D 
Output : E ′ ⊆ E such that E ′ is a set of exceptional axioms w.r.t. ~〈T , E〉 
1 E ′ := ∅ ; 
2 T δE = T ∪ { E  δE  F | E  ∼F ∈ E} , where δE is a new atomic concept; 
3 foreach E 
 ∼F ∈ E do 
4 if T δE | E  δE  ⊥ then 
5 E ′ := E ′ ∪ { E  ∼F } ; 
6 return E ′ 
The procedure ComputeRanking instead, shows how we implement RC.Step 1 in EL ⊥ , which we comment shortly on
next. 
We start by considering an ontology K = 〈T , D〉 . Lines 8–10 loop until we reach a (possibly empty) ﬁxed-point of ex-
ceptional axioms. Then, each axiom C 
 ∼D in the ﬁxed point of the exceptionality function is eliminated from D ∗ (line 12)
and we add C ⊥ to T ∗ (line 13). We repeat the loop in lines 5–13 until no exceptional axioms can be found anymore (i.e.,
E i = E i +1 = ∅ , for some i ≥0). 
Remark 5. Note that the loop in between lines 5–13 allows us to move all the strict knowledge possibly ‘hidden’ inside the
DBox to the TBox. That is, there may be defeasible axioms in the DBox that are actually equivalent to classical axioms, and,
thus, can be moved from the DBox to the TBox as classical inclusion axioms. Example 4 illustrates such a case. 
Procedure: ComputeRanking( K ) 
Input : Ontology K = 〈T , D〉 
Output : Ontology 〈T ∗, D ∗〉 , partitioning (ranking) R = {D 0 , . . . , D n } of D ∗
1 T ∗:= T ; 
2 D ∗:= D; 
3 R := ∅ ; 
4 repeat 
5 i := 0; 
6 E 0 := D ∗; 
7 E 1 := Exceptional (T ∗, E 0 ); 
8 while E i +1  = E i do 
9 i := i + 1; 
10 E i +1 := Exceptional (T ∗, E i ); 
11 D ∞ := E i ; 
12 D ∗ := D ∗ \ D ∞ ; 
13 T ∗ := T ∗ ∪ { E  ⊥ | E  ∼ F ∈ D ∞ } ; 
14 until D ∞ = ∅ ; 
15 for j = 1 to i do 
16 D j−1 := E j−1 \ E j ; 
17 R := R ∪ {D j−1 } ; 
18 return 〈 〈T ∗, D ∗〉 , R 〉 
Lines 15–17 determine the rank value of the remaining defeasible axioms not in D ∞ . That is, set D j−1 is the set of
axioms of rank j − 1 (1 ≤ j ≤ i ), which are the axioms in E j−1 \ E j . 
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 The following can easily be shown. 
Proposition 10. Consider an ontology K = 〈T , D〉 . Then ComputeRanking (K) returns the ontology 〈T ∗, D ∗〉 , where D ∗ is
partitioned into a sequence D 0 , . . . , D n , where T ∗, D ∗ and all D i are equal to the sets T •, D • and D •0 , . . . , D •n obtained via
RC.Step 1 . 
Also, once we have applied the procedure ComputeRanking , the proposition corresponding in the EL ⊥ framework to
Proposition 4 holds. 
Proposition 11. Given an ontology K ∗ = 〈T ∗, D ∗〉 , obtained from the application of the procedure ComputeRanking to an on-
tology K = 〈T , D〉 , for every concept C , 
T ∗δD ∗ | C  δD ∗  ⊥ , 
if and only if C is exceptional w.r.t. K ∗ . 
Next, we describe some examples that illustrate the behaviour of the ranking procedure. The following example shows
a case in which there is non-defeasible knowledge ‘hidden’ in a DBox and that more than one cycle of the lines 4–14 in
ComputeRanking is needed to extract this information. 
Example 4. Let K = 〈T , D〉 be an ontology with 
T = { A  B, 
B  D  ⊥ } 
D = { B  ∼C, 
A 
 ∼D, 
E 
 ∼∃ r.A } . 
It can be veriﬁed that the execution of ComputeRanking (K) is as follows: 
T ∗ = T , D ∗ = D, R = ∅ 
repeat 1 i = 0 E 0 = D ∗, E 1 = { A  ∼D } 
i = 1 E 2 = { A  ∼D } (end while) 
D ∞ = E 2 = { A  ∼D } 
D ∗ = D ∗ \ { A  ∼D } = { B  ∼C, E  ∼∃ r.A } 
T ∗ = T ∗ ∪ { A  ⊥} = { A  B, B  D  ⊥ , A  ⊥} 
repeat 2 i = 0 E 0 = D ∗, E 1 = { E  ∼∃ r.A } 
i = 1 E 2 = { E  ∼∃ r.A } (end while) 
D ∞ = E 2 = { E  ∼∃ r.A } 
D ∗ = D ∗ \ { E  ∼∃ r.A } = { B  ∼C} 
T ∗ = T ∗ ∪ { E  ⊥} = { A  B, B  D  ⊥ , A  ⊥ , E  ⊥} 
repeat 3 i = 0 E 0 = D ∗, E 1 = ∅ 
i = 1 E 2 = ∅ (end while) 
D ∞ = E 2 
D ∗ = D ∗ \ ∅ = { B  ∼C} 
T ∗ = T ∗ ∪ ∅ = { A  B, B  D  ⊥ , A  ⊥ , E  ⊥} (end repeat) 
for j = 1 D 0 = E 0 \ E 1 = { B  ∼C} 
R = R ∪ {D 0 } = {D 0 } (end for) 
Therefore, ComputeRanking (K) terminates with 
T ∗ = { A  B, B  D  ⊥ , A  ⊥ , E  ⊥ } 
D ∗ = { B  ∼C } 
R = { D 0 } 
D 0 = { B  ∼C } . 
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 The only defeasible axiom in D ∗ is B  ∼C, which has rank 0. Axioms A  ∼D and E  ∼∃ r.A have rank ∞ instead, and so
are substituted by the classical axioms A ⊥ and E ⊥ . Note that we need to iterate the loop in lines 5–13 in procedure
ComputeRanking more than once to determine such ranking values. In fact, in the ﬁrst round we get A ⊥ , while the second
round we get also E ⊥ . 
Example 5. Consider the ontology K in Example 3 . It can be veriﬁed that the execution of ComputeRanking (K) is as
follows: 
T ∗ = T , D ∗ = D, R = ∅ 
repeat 1 i = 0 E 0 = D ∗, E 1 = { MRBC  ∼NotN } 
i = 1 E 2 = ∅ 
i = 2 E 3 = ∅ (end while) 
D ∞ = E 3 = ∅ 
D ∗ = D ∗ \ ∅ = D 
T ∗ = T ∗ ∪ ∅ = T (end repeat) 
for j = 1 D 0 = E 0 \ E 1 = { VRBC  ∼∃ hasCM .  , VRBC  ∼∃ hasN . } 
R = R ∪ {D 0 } = {D 0 } 
j = 2 D 1 = E 1 \ E 2 = { MRBC  ∼NotN } 
R = R ∪ {D 1 } = {D 0 , D 1 } (end for) 
Therefore, ComputeRanking (K) terminates with 
T ∗ = { BRBC  MRBC , ARBC  VRBC , MRBC  VRBC , ∃ hasN .   NotN  ⊥ } 
D ∗ = { VRBC  ∼∃ hasCM .  , VRBC  ∼∃ hasN .  , MRBC  ∼NotN } 
R = { D 0 , D 1 } 
D 0 = { VRBC  ∼∃ hasCM .  , VRBC  ∼∃ hasN .  } 
D 1 = { MRBC  ∼NotN } . 
Defeasible axioms in D 0 have rank value 0, while the axiom in D 1 has rank value 1. 
Remark 6. From Propositions 7 and 10 , and Corollary 8 , we immediately also get decision procedures for EL ⊥ to determine
both whether classical GCIs are in the RC of an ontology and whether an ontology has a ranked model, so we do not address
these decision problems further. 
The Subsumption Decision Procedure So far, we have deﬁned a procedure that determines the rank value of the axioms in
a KB, which is based on a sequence of classical EL ⊥ subsumption decision steps (those in the Exceptional procedure, line
4). As next, we illustrate how we are going to implement RC.Step 2 using EL ⊥ subsumption tests only and, thus, get an
algorithm to decide whether a defeasible axiom C 
 ∼D is in the RC of an EL ⊥ KB. Speciﬁcally, given a KB K, let us assume
that we have applied to it the ComputeRanking procedure and, thus, the returned KB does not have defeasible inclusion
axioms with ∞ as rank value. 
In the following, given K = 〈T , D〉 as the output of the ComputeRanking procedure, with D partitioned into D 0 , . . . , D n ,
and given new atomic concepts δi (0 ≤ i ≤n ), we deﬁne T δi as 
T δi = T ∪ { E  δi  F | E  ∼F ∈ D i ∪ . . . ∪ D n } . (5)
Remark 7. The purpose of deﬁnition T δi is to encode the concepts H i in RC. Step 2.2 as EL ⊥ GCIs. Speciﬁcally, the aim is
to replace the subsumption tests 
T ∗ | H i  ¬ C (6)
T ∗ | C  H i  D (7)
in Step 2.2 with the two equivalent EL ⊥ subsumptions tests 
T ∗δi | C  δi  ⊥ (8)
T ∗δ | C  δi  D . (9)i 
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 respectively. 
Proposition 12. By referring to Remark 7 , the subsumption test (6) (resp. 7 ) is equivalent to the subsumption test (8) (resp. 9 ). 
Example 6. Example 5 cont. From 〈〈T ∗, D ∗〉 , R 〉 in Example 5 , we get by deﬁnition that 
T ∗δ0 = T ∗ ∪ { VRBC  δ0  ∃ hasCM .  , 
VRBC  δ0  ∃ hasN .  , 
MRBC  δ0  NotN } . 
and 
T ∗δ1 = T ∗ ∪ { MRBC  δ1  NotN } . 
Note that we get the following results: 
T ∗δ0 | MRBC  δ0  ⊥ 
T ∗δ0 | VRBC  δ0  ⊥ 
T ∗δ1 | MRBC  δ1  ⊥ 
Procedure RationalClosure illustrates how we implement the subsumption decision procedure for ALC under RC, using 
EL ⊥ subsumption tests only. Note that essentially lines 1–7 implement RC.Step 1 , while lines 8 - 18 implement RC.Step 2 . 
Procedure: RationalClosure( K, α ) 
Input : Ontology K and defeasible axiom α of the form C  ∼ D 
Output : true iff C  ∼ D is in the Rational Closure of K 
1 CL := T | C  D //Check if α holds classically; 
2 if CL then 
3 return CL 
4 〈 〈T ∗, D ∗〉 , {D 0 , . . . , D n }〉 := ComputeRanking (K); 
5 CL := T ∗ | C  D //Check if α holds classically, after ﬁnding strict knowledge in D; 
6 if CL then 
7 return CL 
8 //Compute C’s rank i ; 
9 i := 0; D R := D ∗; 
10 T δ0 := T ∗ ∪ { E  δ0  F | E  ∼ F ∈ D R } , where δ0 is a new atomic concept; 
11 while T δi | C  δi  ⊥ and D R  = ∅ do 
12 D R := D R \D i ; i := i + 1 ; 
13 T δi := T ∗ ∪ { E  δi  F | E  ∼ F ∈ D R } , where δi is a new atomic concept; 
14 // Check now if α holds under RC; 
15 if T δi | C  δi  ⊥ then 
16 return T δi | C  δi  D 
17 else 
18 return CL 
Example 7. ( Example 6 cont.) We want to decide whether the red blood cells of a bovine ( BRBC ) should presumably have
a nucleus, that is, whether BRBC 
 ∼∃ hasN .  , BRBC  ∼notN , or neither of them are in the RC of K . 
First of all, we determine the rank of BRBC , then we check whether we can conclude that the typical elements of BRBC
are in hasN .  (or in notN ). We have that 
T ∗δ0 | BRBC  δ0  ⊥ 
T ∗δ1 | BRBC  δ1  ⊥ . 
Hence BRBC is of rank 1, and we can associate with it the defeasible information of rank 1, that is, we can use the TBox
T ∗
δ1 
. 
T ∗δ1 | BRBC  δ1  ∃ hasN .  
T ∗δ | BRBC  δ1  notN . 1 
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RTherefore, we conclude that it’s not the case that the red blood cells of bovines presumably have a nucleus. That is,
RationalClosure (K, BRBC  ∼∃ hasN .  ) and RationalClosure (K, BRBC  ∼notN ) return respectively false and true . 
By Propositions 6, 10 , and 12 , and by construction of the RationalClosure procedure, we immediately get the following
result. 
Proposition 13. Consider an EL ⊥ ontology K = 〈T , D〉 and a defeasible GCI C  ∼D . Then, C  ∼D is in the RC of K iff
RationalClosure (K, C  ∼D ) returns true. 
3.2. Computational Complexity 
Classical subsumption can be decided in polynomial time for EL ⊥ [3] . We next show that our subsumption decision
procedure under RC requires a polynomial number of classical subsumption test and, thus, is polynomial overall w.r.t. the
size of a KB. 
As we have seen, the entire procedure can be reduced to a sequence of classical entailments tests, while all other op-
erations are linearly bounded by the size of the KB. Therefore, in order to determine the computational complexity of our
method, we have to check, given a KB K = 〈T , D〉 as input, how many classical entailment tests are required in the worst
case. 
It is easily veriﬁed that Exceptional (T , E ) performs at most |E| ∈ O (|D | ) subsumption tests. Now, let us analyse
ComputeRanking (K) . Line 7 requires O (|D | ) subsumption test. Lines 8–10 require at most O (|D | 2 ) subsumption tests
as at each round, |E i +1 | is |E i | − 1 in the worst case. At each repeat round |D ∗| decreases in size (at line 12), and thus
the repeat loop is iterated at most O (|D | ) times. Therefore, ComputeRanking requires at most O (|D | 3 ) subsumption
tests. This gives us the following proposition: 
Proposition 14. Given a KB K = 〈T , D〉 , procedure ComputeRanking runs in polynomial time w.r.t. the size of K . 
Note that if the KB remains unchanged in between several defeasible subsumption tests, then the ranking procedure
needs to be executed only once. 
Now consider RationalClosure (K, α) . Lines 1–3 require one subsumption test. In line 4, the value of n is bounded by
|D| and line 4 requires at most O (|D | 3 ) subsumption tests. Lines 5–7 require one subsumption test. The loop in lines
11–13 is executed at most |D| times (as at each loop |D R | decreases), at each iteration we execute one subsumption test
only, and there are at most two subsumption tests between lines 15–18. Hence, RationalClosure (K, α) requires at most
O (|D | 3 + |D | ) subsumption tests. Therefore, 
Proposition 15. Procedure RationalClosure , that decides whether the defeasible inclusion axiom C 
 ∼D is in the RC of K =
〈T , D〉 , runs in polynomial time w.r.t. the size of K . 
3.3. Normal Form. 
Usually, a classical EL ⊥ ontology is transformed into a normal form to which one then applies a subsumption decision
procedure [3] . In the following, we extend the notion of normal form to defeasible EL ⊥ ontologies, and show that our
subsumption decision procedure works ﬁne for normalised ontologies as well. 8 That is, the normal form transformation of
an ontology K is a conservative extension of K also w.r.t. RC. So, let us recap that a classical EL ⊥ ontology is in normal
form if the axioms in it have the form: 
• C 1  D 
• C 1 C 2  D 
• ∃ r . C 1  D 
• C 1 ∃ r . C 2 
where C 1 , C 2 ∈ N C ∪ {} and D ∈ N C ∪ { , ⊥} . One may transform axioms into normal form by applying the following
rules: 
1: C  ˆ D  E → ˆ D  A, C  A  E ; 
2: ∃ r. ˆ  C  D → ˆ C  A, ∃ r.A  D ; 
3: ⊥ D →∅ . 
4: ˆ C  ˆ D → ˆ C  A, A  ˆ D ; 
5: B  ∃ r. ˆ  C → B  ∃ r.A, A  ˆ C ; 
6: B  C D → B  C , B  D , 
8 KBs in normal form are also needed in Section 4 . 
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 where ˆ C , ˆ D / ∈ N C ∪ {} , and A is a new atomic concept. Rules R1-R3 are applied ﬁrst, then rules R4–R6 are applied, until
no more rule can be applied. It is easily veriﬁed that the transformation is time polynomial and entailment preserving, i.e.,
given a TBox T and its normal form transformation T ′ , then T | C  D iff T ′ | C  D for every C , D not using any of
the newly introduced atomic concepts A by the rules R 1 − R 6 above. 
The above result is not suﬃcient to guarantee that we can apply this kind of transformation also to defeasible KBs. The
problem is that the notion of logical equivalence in a preferential setting, or rank equivalence as we have called it up to now,
follows rules that are slightly different from the ones characterising logical equivalence in classical reasoning. In particular,
we are allowed to substitute a concept with a logically equivalent one on the left of a defeasible subsumption relation (LLE
allows it) and on the right (a consequence of RW). However, there are cases that are equivalent in their classical formulation
but not equivalent in the preferential one. For example, the two axioms C  D and  ¬C D are equivalent, while C  ∼D and
  ∼¬ C unionsq D are not rank equivalent (in fact, they convey different meanings, with the former indicating that all the most
typical C’s are D’s, and the latter indicating that the most typical objects are either not C’s or D’s). Therefore, the normal
form transformation rules have to preserve rank equivalence, which we are going to check next. 
So, let K = 〈T , D〉 be a defeasible ontology. We say that D is in normal form if each defeasible axiom in D is of the
form A 
 ∼B, where A, B ∈ N C . We say that K is in normal form if T and D are in normal form. We next show how to
transform K = 〈T , D〉 into normal form. First, we replace every axiom C  ∼D ∈ D with an axiom A C  ∼A D (with A C , A D new
atomic concepts), and add A C = C and A D = D to the TBox T (they are both valid EL ⊥ expressions); then we apply the
classical EL ⊥ normalisation steps to the axioms in T . In this way, we end up with a new knowledge base 〈T ′ , D ′ 〉 that is
in normal form. This transformation still remains, of course, time polynomial. 
Example 8. A normal form of the KB in Example 3 is K = 〈T , D〉 with 
T = { BRBC  MRBC , 
ARBC  VRBC , 
MRBC  VRBC , 
∃ hasN .   A 1 , 
A 1  ∃ hasN .  , 
∃ hasCM .   A 2 , 
A 2  ∃ hasCM .  , 
A 1  NotN  ⊥ } 
D = { VRBC  ∼A 2 , 
VRBC 
 ∼A 1 , 
MRBC 
 ∼NotN } . 
We can prove that the ranking procedure gives back equivalent results whether we apply it to K = 〈T , D〉 or to its
normal form transformation K ′ = 〈T ′ , D ′ 〉 . To this end, it suﬃces to show the following. 
Proposition 16. Given an ontology K = 〈T , D〉 , C  ∼D ∈ D and the corresponding ontology in normal form K ′ = 〈T ′ , D ′ 〉 , then C
is exceptional w.r.t. K iff A C is exceptional w.r.t. K ′ , where A C is the new atomic concept introduced by the normalisation procedure
to replace C 
 ∼D with A C  ∼A D . 
Therefore, given an ontology K = 〈T , D〉 , C  ∼D ∈ D and the corresponding ontology in normal form K ′ = 〈T ′ , D ′ 〉 , by
Proposition 16 and by construction of the ComputeRanking procedure it follows that C 
 ∼D ∈ D i iff A C  ∼A D ∈ D ′ i , where
R = {D 0 , . . . , D n } and R ′ = {D ′ 0 , . . . , D ′ n } are the partitions computed by the ranking procedure applied to K and K ′ , 
respectively. From this, we immediately get the following result. 
Proposition 17. Given an ontology K = 〈T , D〉 and its normal form translation K ′ = 〈T ′ , D ′ 〉 , then for every pair of atomic
EL ⊥ -concepts A , B occurring in K, K  rc A  ∼B iff K ′  rc A  ∼B . 
Observe that, using a KB in normal form, all steps of our RC decision procedure use classical EL ⊥ TBoxes in normal
form(as axioms A C δi  A D are in normal form, too). 
4. Defeasibleinheritance-based description logics 
So far, we have considered RC [37,41] : both the procedural and the semantic characterisations are well deﬁned, and
directly model a principle that is at the core of typicality reasoning: the presumption of typicality . Moreover, RC is a syntac-
tically independent form of closure. That is, all the KBs that are rank equivalent generate the same RC (to the best of our
knowledge, no other form of closure extending RC satisﬁes this property). 
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 Proposition 18. Let K = 〈T , D〉 and K ′ = 〈T ′ , D ′ 〉 be rank equivalent. For every EL ⊥ defeasible GCI C  ∼D, C  ∼D is in the RC
of K iff C  ∼D is in the RC of K ′ . 
Yet, it is well-known that the main limitation of RC, from an inferential point of view, is that an exceptional subclass
cannot inherit any of the typical properties of its superclass (also known as Drowning Effect ) 
Example 9. Consider Examples 5 and 7 . The mammalian red blood cells are an exceptional subclass of the vertebrate red
blood cells since they do not have a nucleus. So, the conﬂict determining the exceptionality of MRBC is determined by the
axioms VRBC 
 ∼∃ hasN .  and MRBC  ∼NotN , while there is no conﬂict w.r.t. the axiom VRBC  ∼∃ hasCM .  . Hence, it seems
still reasonable to conclude that mammalian red blood cells have a cell membrane (i.e., MRBC 
 ∼∃ hasCM .  ). However, as
shown in Example 5 , VRBC 
 ∼∃ hasCM .  ∈ D 0 and the rank of MRBC is 1 and, thus, we cannot conclude MRBC  ∼∃ hasCM . 
under RC. 
In order to overcome such inferential limits, some closure operations extending RC have been proposed in DLs: for ex-
ample, the defeasible Inheritance-based approach [14] , the Relevant Closure [15] , and the Lexicographic Closure [16] . Here
we consider a modiﬁcation of RC based on the use of inheritance nets to identify the axioms taking part in each speciﬁc
conﬂict [14] . As we are going to see, the Defeasible Inheritance-based approach is interesting when considering the EL ⊥
framework since both it allows to overcome the drowning effect and preserves computational tractability. 9 
Remark 8. At the time of writing, we neither found a tractable procedure to decide defeasible subsumption under Relevant
Closure nor for Lexicographic Closure [15,16] . In fact, we conjecture that no tractable procedures exist for these cases. 
In the Defeasible Inheritance-based approach [14] the axioms in the TBox and in the DBox are translated into an inher-
itance net [32] . Such a construction allows us to apply the RC procedure locally, in such a way that if we want to decide
whether C 
 ∼D holds, the exceptionality ranking and the RC are calculated considering only the information in the KB that
has some connection to C and D . For more details about the formalisation and inference properties of the approach, we refer
the reader to [14] . 
Basic notions on Inheritance Nets Nevertheless, for the sake of self-containedness, we brieﬂy recap here some salient
notions from [14] . In Defeasible Inheritance Nets , or simply Inheritance Nets (INs) [32] there are classes ( nodes ), a strict sub-
sumption relation and a defeasible subsumption relation among such classes ( links ). An IN is a pair N = 〈 S, D 〉 , where S is
a set of strict links , while D is a set of defeasible links . Every link in N is a direct link, and it can be strict or defeasible,
positive or negative. Speciﬁcally, 
1. C ⇒ D : class C is subsumed by class Q [positive strict link]; 
2. C ⇔ D : class C and class Q are disjoint [negative strict link]; 
3. C → D : an element of the class C is usually an element of the class D [positive defeasible link]; 
4. C → D : an element of the class C is usually not an element of the class Q [negative defeasible link]. 
Deﬁnition 7 (Course, Deﬁnition 3.1 in [14] ) . Courses are deﬁned as follows (where  ∈ {⇒ , ⇔ , → , →} ): 
1. every link C  D in N is a course π = 〈 C, D 〉 in N ; and 
2. if π = 〈 σ, C〉 is a course and C  D is a link in N that does not already appear in π , then π ′ = 〈 π, D 〉 is a course in N . 
Roughly, courses are simply routes on the net following the direction of the arrows, without considering if each of them
is a positive or a negative arrow. 
In [14] , INs have been extended to, so-called Boolean Inheritance Nets (BINs), that allow additionally to represent the
negation, conjunction and disjunction of nodes. For what concerns us here, given nodes C , D and E , a conjunction link is of
the form C , D ⇔ ∧ E (read as the conjunction of C and D is equivalent to E ). We will assume that inheritance nets containing
such links are closed according to the following rule: if there is C , D ⇔ ∧ E in a net, then there are also E ⇒ C and E ⇒ D in the
net. Furthermore, the notion of courses is extended to BINs, calling them ducts [14, Deﬁnition 3.2] . That is, we consider not
only ‘linear’ routes from one node to another, but also ‘parallel’ routes, in order to model the introduction of the conjunction.
Roughly, 
π = 〈 C, σ
σ ′ , D 〉 
will indicate a duct π that starts at node C and develops through the ducts σ and σ ′ , both reaching the node D . 
Deﬁnition 8 (Duct, Deﬁnition 3.2 in [14] ) . Ducts are deﬁned as follows (where  ∈ {⇒ , ⇔ , → , →} ): 
1. every link C  D in N is a duct π = 〈 C, D 〉 in N ; 
2. if π = 〈 C, σ, D 〉 is a duct and D  E is a link in N that does not already appear in σ , then π ′ = 〈 C, σ, D, E〉 is a duct in N
; 9 In [14, Appendix A] it is also shown that the defeasible inheritance-based approach behaves well and better than RC w.r.t. most of the “benchmark”
examples illustrated there. 
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Step  3. if π = 〈 C, σ, D 〉 is a duct and E  C is a link in N that does not already appear in σ , then π ′ = 〈 E, C, σ, D 〉 is a duct in N
; 
4. if 〈 C , σ , D 〉 and 〈 C , σ ′ , E 〉 are ducts and D , E ⇔ ∧ F is a link in N that does not already appear in 〈 C , σ , D 〉 and in 〈 C , σ ′ ,
E 〉 , then 〈 C, σ,D 
σ ′ ,E , F 〉 is a duct. 
A Decision procedure for INs-based EL ⊥ Now, the adaptation of the inheritance-based decision procedure [14, Section 5] to
EL ⊥ can be formalised in the following way. First of all, we assume that a KB 〈T , D〉 has already been transformed into
normal form , as discussed in Section 3.3 . Then, we create an inheritance net N K representing the content of the KB. The
procedure is essentially the one in [14] , just constrained to EL ⊥ . 
That is, given a KB 〈T , D〉 : 
1. for every atomic concept appearing in the axioms in K, we create a corresponding node in the net; 
2. for every axiom A 
 ∼B ∈ D, we add the defeasible link A → B to the net; 
3. for every axiom A  B  ⊥ ∈ T we add the symmetric incompatibility link A ⇔ B to the net; 
4. for all the remaining axioms (in normal form) C  D ∈ T , we introduce (if not already present) two nodes in the net
representing the concepts C and D , respectively, and add the strict connection C ⇒ D to the net; 
5. we then complete the inheritance net N K doing a total classiﬁcation of the concepts appearing as nodes in the net. That
is, for concepts C , D , where C and concept D are either atomic concepts or of the form ∃ r . F , and E (not being  ), that
have a node representation in N K , if T | C  D  E holds then we add also a link C , D ⇔ ∧ E to the net N K . 
Note that nodes in N K represent concepts that are either ⊥ ,  , atomic, of the form ∃ r . F or the conjunction of two atomic
concepts. 
Now, the procedure for the closure of a KB 〈T , D〉 using the Defeasible Inheritance-based approach, adapted to EL ⊥ , is
as follows [14] : 
 1. Given K = 〈T , D〉 , check if K has a ranked model (see Corollary 8 and Remark 6 ). If yes, then deﬁne an inheritance net
N K from K, as illustrated before. 
2. Set D in = D . For every pair of nodes 〈 C , D 〉 such that C and D appear in the net N K , do the following: 
• determine the set C , D of defeasible links E → F appearing in a duct from C to D ; 
• consider the KB K ′ = 〈T , D ′ 〉 , where D ′ ⊆ D is the set of the defeasible axioms corresponding to the defeasible links
in C , D ; 
• if C 
 ∼D is in the RC of K ′ (i.e. K ′  rc C  ∼D ), then add C  ∼D to D in . 
3. Finally, let K in = 〈T , D in 〉 . We can use the decision procedure for RC on K in , deﬁning the non-monotonic inference
relation  in as 
K  in C  ∼D iff K in  rc C  ∼D . 
The above steps are implemented in procedure InheritanceBasedRationalClosure . 
Procedure: InheritanceBasedRationalClosure( K, α ) 
Input : Ontology K and defeasible EL ⊥ axiom α
Output : true iff K  in α
1 〈K , α〉 := Normalise (K , α) //normalise both K and α; 
2 CT D : = RationalClosure (K,   ∼⊥ ) //Check if K rank unsatisﬁable; 
3 if CTD then 
4 return CT D 
5 N K := BuildInheritanceNet (K) //Build inheritance net N K from K; 
6 D in := D; 
7 foreach C, D ∈ N K do 
8 C,D := { E  F | E  F defeasible link occurring in a duct from C to D } ; 
9 D ′ := { E  ∼F ∈ D | E → F ∈ C,D } ∪ { E  ∼¬ F ∈ D | E → F ∈ C,D } ; 
10 K ′ := 〈T , D ′ 〉 ; 
11 if RationalClosure (K ′ , C  ∼D ) then 
12 D in := D in ∪ { C  ∼D } 
13 // Check now if α holds under Inheritance-Based RC; 
14 K in := 〈T , D in 〉 ; 
15 IRC : = RationalClosure (K in , α) ; 
16 return IRC; 
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Fig. 1. Inheritance net built from Example 10 . 
(
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Remark 9. One may wonder whether the third item in Step 2 may be replaced with the simpler form 
 
∗) if C  ∼D is in D ′ then add C  ∼D to D in . 
Unfortunately, this choice does not provide the intended behaviour as the following variant of the “penguin” example
illustrates (see also [14, Example 3.1] ). Consider K = 〈T , D〉 with 10 
T = { F  NF  ⊥ 
D = { P  ∼B , B  ∼F , P  ∼NF , P  ∼W} 
and corresponding inheritance net: 
B
P NF
F
W
It then can be shown (as desired) that 
K  in P  ∼W , 
In fact, as P , W = { P  ∼B , B  ∼W} , by item three in Step 2., we add P  ∼W to D in , which is not the case if ( ∗) is used instead.
Therefore, as P is an exceptional subclass of B , we have 
K  rc P  ∼W 
K  in P  ∼W , if using (∗) instead . 
The correspondence of this procedure to the more general ALC procedure in [14] is guaranteed by Proposition 13 ,
proving that the procedure RationalClosure is correct and complete w.r.t. RC, and the fact that the present deﬁnition of
ducts is just the EL ⊥ restriction of the more general deﬁnition for ALC ( [14] , Deﬁnition 3.2). 
Example 10. ( Example 8 cont.) Consider Example 8 . The inheritance net N K built from K is illustrated in Fig. 1 . 
We want to check whether K  in MRBC  ∼∃ hasCM .  holds. To do so, we compute all ducts between MRBC and
hasCM .  . There is only one and it includes the defeasible link representing VRBC  ∼A 2 . Therefore, in Step 10 of the
InheritanceBasedRationalClosure procedure, we set D ′ = { VRBC  ∼A 2 } . It can be veriﬁed that MRBC  ∼A 2 is in the RC
of K ′ = 〈T , D ′ 〉 and, thus, by Step 12, MRBC  ∼A 2 is added to D in , from which K  in MRBC  ∼∃ hasCM .  follows. 
Next, we want also to show that indeed K  in MRBC  ∼∃ hasN .  . Now, observe that for nodes C ∈ { MRBC } and D ∈
{ A 1 , hasN . } , D ′ in line 9 of the procedure is 
D ′ = { MRBC  ∼hasN .  , MRBC  ∼NotN } . 10 P , B , W, F stand for Penguin, Bird, Wing and Fly, respectively. 
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 Therfore, for D ∈ { A 1 , hasN . } 
K ′  rc MRBC  ∼D , 
holds and, thus, MRBC 
 ∼D is not added to D in . Consequently, for D ∈ { A 1 , hasN . } 
K  in MRBC  ∼D 
holds, as expected. 
Computational Complexity Let us now address the computational complexity of the InheritanceBasedRationalClosure 
procedure. To start with, note that the normalisation Step 1 can be done in linear time [3] , yielding a normalised
KB whose size is linear in the size of K . From the procedure described in Section 3 , it follows that Step 2 of
InheritanceBasedRationalClosure requires at most O (|D | 3 + |D | ) subsumption tests. 
Let us now estimate the cost of Step 5. The ﬁrst step of the construction of N K creates as many nodes as there are
atomic concepts in K and, thus, both size and time bound are O(|K| ) . The second step is obviously bounded both in
time and size of number of edges by O (|D | ) . Similarly, the third and fourth step can be done together and are bounded
both in time and size of number of new nodes and edges by O(|T | ) . Therefore, Steps 1–4 can be done in time O(|K| ) , 
while for network N K , the number of both nodes and edges is bounded by O(|K| ) . Eventually, it can easily be veriﬁed
that, including the ﬁfth step of the construction of N K , the overall time bound of the construction of N K is time and size
(number of nodes as well as edges) bounded by O(|K| 2 ) . 
The number of iterations of Steps 7–12 is bounded by O(|K| 4 ) , as there are at most O(|K| 2 ) nodes in N K . Step 8 is
the same step as illustrated in [14] , in which it is shown that C , D can be computed in polynomial time w.r.t. the size of K
[14, Sections 3.1.6 and 3.2.5] . For ease of presentation, let us indicate with δK the time bound to compute C , D . Moreover,
the size of both C , D and D ′ is bounded by O (|D | ) and, thus, the size of K ′ is bounded by O(|K| ) . Therefore, Step 12
requires at most O (|D | 3 + |D | ) subsumption tests. In summary, the computation time of iterations Steps 7–12 is bounded
by O(δK · |K| 4 ) plus the time required to perform O(|K| 4 | (|D| 3 + |D| )) subsumption tests. 
Finally, the size of D in is bounded by O(|K| 2 ) and, thus, Step 15 may require at most O(|K| 6 + |K| 2 ) subsumption
tests. Therefore, we have the following result. 
Proposition 19. Procedure InheritanceBasedRationalClosure , that decides whether a defeasible inclusion axiom C 
 ∼D is in
the Inheritance-based RC of K = 〈T , D〉 , i.e. decides whether K  in C  ∼D holds, runs in polynomial time w.r.t. the size of K . 
5. Rational closure for nominal safe ELO ⊥ 
In order to reason about individuals in a defeasible framework, more than one option is possible. Here we present an
idea in which we use concept nominals, i.e. concepts of the form { a }. There are other options as well developed in a formal
framework analogous to the one we are going to present here and compatible with it [12–14] . In [27,29] other ways of
reasoning about individuals in the preferential framework has been proposed, while in [8] a different kind of semantics is
introduced. 
Recall that by using nominals we can easily translate an assertion as a GCI as pointed out in Remark 1 , and that the
standard interpretation of nominals is a singleton from the domain. 
Our approach to deal with nominals in defeasible ELO ⊥ starts with the possibility to express defeasible information
about individuals by using axioms of the form { a }  ∼C (read as “presumably, individual a is an instance of concept C ”) and
{ a }  ∼∃ r. { b} (“presumably, individual a is connected via role r to individual b ”). Since we are working in a defeasible framework,
we would like to apply the presumption of typicality (see Section 2.2 ) also to individuals. That is, we want to reason under the
assumption that each individual behaves in the most typical possible way, compatibly with the information at our disposal.
A main problem in enforcing the typicality of individuals is that role connections may possibly create situations in which
the defeasible information associated with an individual prevents it from associating some defeasible information to another
individual, and vice-versa, as illustrated in the next example. 
Example 11. Consider the following defeasible ELO ⊥ KB K = 〈T , D〉 with 
T = {{ a }  ∃ r. { b} , C  D  ⊥} 
D = {  ∼C, ∃ r.C  ∼D } . 
By applying the ranking procedure to K, it can be shown that D is partitioned into 
D 0 = {  ∼C} 
D 1 = {∃ r.C  ∼D } . 
Now, let’s try to create a minimal model for this KB, in order to maximise the typicality also of the individuals (see
Section 2.2 ). If we position the interpretation of individual a in layer 0, 11 then both   ∼C and ∃ r.C  ∼D may be ‘applied’11 See the deﬁnition of layers at page 8. 
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 to a and, thus, a : C holds. But then we are forced to position b on layer 1 to impose that b : C does not hold, as otherwise
we would have also a : ∃ r . C and a : D , and then we would be forced to conclude a : ⊥ (since C D ⊥ ). On the other hand, if
we put b on layer 0 we would be forced to put a on layer 1 to impose that a : C does not hold, again to avoid a : ⊥ to hold.
Therefore, we have at least two (minimal) ranked models. 
Note that if we would apply the so far developed RC procedure to ELO ⊥ (see page 12) we would infer instead that
both { a }  ∼C and { b}  ∼C hold, and, thus, { a }  ∼D would follow, from which we would conclude { a }  ∼⊥ . I.e., we get an
inconsistency. 
Eventually, note that we face with the same problem with the following KB K ′ = 〈T ′ , D ′ 〉 : 
T ′ = { A = { a } , B = { b} , A  ∃ r.B, C  D  ⊥} 
D ′ = {  ∼C, ∃ r.C  ∼D } . 
That is, not only individual a (resp. b ) does not have the same rank among all ranked models of K ′ , but the same applies
to atomic concept A (resp. B ). 
The multiplicity of incompatible minimal conﬁgurations allows us to make a distinction between two distinct kinds of
presumptive reasoning. Roughly, on one hand we have presumptive reasoning, that can be modelled taking under considera-
tion all the most expected situations: an individual a presumably satisﬁes a property C iff a R ∈ C R in all the minimal models R
(of an ontology K ). On the other hand we have prototypical reasoning, where we associate a property C to an individual a if
all the preferred instantiations of a fall under C ; that is, a property C belongs to the prototype of an individual a if a R ∈ C R for
every minimal model R of K in which a R is in the lowest possible rank. 12 We refer the reader to Appendix B ( Deﬁnitions 10,
11 and 12 ) for a formal distinction among the two above mentioned approaches. 
While the presumptive reasoning solution can be modelled following previous proposals [12,14] , no polynomial time
algorithm of its application to ELO ⊥ seems to exist so far (see also Section 6 ). 
In this work, we rather investigate the second option. In order to model this kind of reasoning, we propose to introduce a
change in the interpretation of nominals. Our approach not only will allow us to model prototypical reasoning, but provides
us also with a simple way to use the decision procedure presented so far. An important side effect is that we can preserve
the polynomial time result for the subsumption problem. 
Speciﬁcally, our intuition is that reasoning about individuals in a defeasible framework means to assign to them proper-
ties that we only presume to hold. In order to model such a semantics, we interpret each individual (i.e., each nominal) not
as a singleton, but as a set of objects : each of them represents a possible instantiation of the individual, considering, on the
one hand, the information at our disposal, and, on the other, different possible levels of typicality. In this latter case, this
corresponds to consider different rankings of the individual (kind of ‘set of prototypes of an individual). 
The DL EL 〈O〉 ⊥ Formally, we introduce a new kind of nominal, referred to as defeasible nominal , and denoted with 〈 a 〉 ,
where a ∈ N O . The interpretation function ·I of an interpretation I is extended to defeasible nominals by mapping them
into sets, i.e. 
• 〈 a 〉 I ⊆ I for every individual a ∈ N O . 
The defeasible version of ELO ⊥ , referred to as EL 〈O〉 ⊥ , is EL ⊥ extended with defeasible nominals: 
C, D → A |  | ⊥ | C  D | ∃ r.C | 〈 a 〉 . 
Our reasoning mechanism for EL 〈O〉 ⊥ under RC remains the same as EL ⊥ under RC (and the extension of RC we have
investigated in this work), simply by treating defeasible nominals as new classical atomic concepts in our procedures . 13 There-
fore, we will continue to use the entailment notation  rc also for the extension to defeasible nominals of our entailment
relation for RC. 
The following example illustrates the behaviour of the RC procedure applied to EL 〈O〉 ⊥ . 
Example 12. Consider the ontology in Example 3 extended with the axioms 〈 a 〉  BRBC and 〈 b〉  ARBC , dictating that
we know that a speciﬁc cell a is a red blood cell from a cow, while b refers to a red blood cell from a bird. Now, it can be
shown that, by applying the ranking procedure, we end up with the same partition of D as in Example 5 . That is 
T ∗ = { 〈 a 〉  BRBC , 〈 b〉  ARBC , BRBC  MRBC , 
ARBC  VRBC , MRBC  VRBC , ∃ hasN .   NotN  ⊥ } 
D 0 = { VRBC  ∼∃ hasCM .  , VRBC  ∼∃ hasN .  } 
D 1 = { MRBC  ∼NotN } . 12 A similar distinction was also made by Lehmann in the framework of propositional logic [41] . 
13 The interpretation of defeasible nominals as classical atomic concepts implies that some results required here and valid for EL ⊥ extend to EL 〈O〉 ⊥ 
too: namely, the FMP and FCMP properties deﬁned for defeasible ALC ; also, the procedures Exceptional , ComputeRanking , RationalClosure and 
InheritanceBasedRationalClosure remain the same. 
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 Moreover, as for Example 6 , we end up with the following entailments: 
T ∗δ0 | 〈 a 〉  δ0  ⊥ 
T ∗δ0 | 〈 b〉  δ0  ⊥ 
T ∗δ1 | 〈 a 〉  δ1  ⊥ . 
Hence we have that defeasible nominal 〈 a 〉 has rank 1 (the most prototypical instantiation of a must be of rank 1), while
〈 b 〉 has rank 0 (it is conceivably an instantiation of b in the lowest layer). 
We can now check whether 〈 a 〉 and 〈 b 〉 have a nucleus, following the same procedure as in Example 7 . Since 
T ∗δ1 | 〈 a 〉  δ1  ∃ hasN .  
T ∗δ1 | 〈 a 〉  δ1  notN 
T ∗δ0 | 〈 b〉  δ0  ∃ hasN .  , 
we can conclude now that presumably the cell a does not have a nucleus (i.e., 〈 a 〉  ∼notN ), while b does (i.e., 〈 b〉  ∼∃ hasN .  ).
Such an approach carries the risk to be incompatible with the classical part of our reasoning, where nominals are as-
sumed to be interpreted as singletons. Yet, we will show that the results in [35] , reported here as Propositions 1 and 2 ,
justify our reasoning about nominals by interpreting them as concepts, provided the safeness condition is satisﬁed. That is,
for nominal safe ontologies, the strict part of our knowledge behaves exactly as if we would have interpreted the nominals
as individuals (see Proposition 24 later on). 
To start with, given an EL 〈O〉 ⊥ concept (resp. GCI, ontology) α, we indicate with α{} the ELO ⊥ concept (resp. GCI,
ontology) obtained by substituting every occurrence of each defeasible nominal 〈 a 〉 with a nominal { a }. Vice-versa, given
an ELO ⊥ concept (resp. GCI, ontology) α, we indicate with α〈〉 the EL 〈O〉 ⊥ concept (resp. GCI, ontology) obtained by
substituting every nominal { a } by 〈 a 〉 . Now, it is easy to see that one transformation is the inverse of the other. That is, for
every EL 〈O〉 ⊥ expression α, α = (α{} ) 〈〉 , and for every ELO ⊥ expression α, α = (α〈〉 ) {} . 
The notion of safeness (see Section 2.1 ) is naturally extended to EL 〈O〉 ⊥ : 
• C is safe iff C {} is safe; 
• C is n-safe iff C {} is n-safe; 
• C  D is safe iff ( C  D ) {} is safe; 
• C 
 ∼D is safe iff C is n-safe and D is safe. 
Finally, a defeasible EL 〈O〉 ⊥ ontology K = 〈T , D〉 is nominal safe if it contains only safe axioms. 
Next, we address two aspects of using defeasible nominals that prove that using them instead of standard nominals does
not change the classical part of our reasoning, provided that the ontology is nominal safe. 
The ﬁrst observation is about the ranking procedure. With respect to this point, we can naturally extend the notion of
exceptionality to nominals as follows. 
• A nominal { a } is exceptional w.r.t. an ELO ⊥ ontology K = 〈T , D〉 iff, for every ranked model R ∈ R K , { a } R ∩
min ≺R (
R ) = ∅ . 
• A defeasible nominal 〈 a 〉 is exceptional w.r.t. an EL 〈O〉 ⊥ ontology K = 〈T , D〉 iff, for every ranked model R ∈ R K , 〈 a 〉 R ∩
min ≺R (
R ) = ∅ . 
The respective notion of ranking r K follows the same deﬁnition from Section 2.2 . 
Now, we prove the correctness of the ranking procedure ComputeRanking extended to EL 〈O〉 ⊥ by treating defeasible
nominals as atomic concepts. In particular, we prove that the axioms that have inﬁnite rank w.r.t. an EL 〈O〉 ⊥ ontology
correspond to the axioms that have inﬁnite rank w.r.t. the correspondent ELO ⊥ ontology. Speciﬁcally, the following propo-
sitions can be shown. 14 
Proposition 20. For every n-safe ELO ⊥ concept C and every nominal safe ELO ⊥ ontology K = 〈T , D〉 , the following holds:
r K (C) = i iff r K 〈〉 (C 〈〉 ) = i . 
Proposition 21. For every n-safe EL 〈O〉 ⊥ concept C and every nominal safe EL 〈O〉 ⊥ ontology K = 〈T , D〉 , r K (C) = i iff
r N(K {} ) (N(C {} )) = i . 
From Propositions 20 and 21 it follows that the information of inﬁnite rank w.r.t. an ELO ⊥ defeasible ontology K 
corresponds exactly to the information of inﬁnite rank w.r.t. K 〈〉 . That is, 
Proposition 22. Let K = 〈T , D〉 be a nominal safe EL 〈O〉 ontology, with C  ∼D ∈ D . Then, the following are equivalent: ⊥ 
14 See the RC ranking procedure at page 9 for the deﬁnition of the rank r K (C) of a concept C w.r.t. a knowledge base K, while see page 5 for the 
deﬁnition of N ( · ). 
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 1. r K (C 
 ∼D ) = ∞ ; 
2. r K {} (C {} 
 ∼D {} ) = ∞ ; 
3. r N(K {} ) (N(C {} 
 ∼D {} )) = ∞ . 
An immediate consequence is that we can safely use ComputeRanking over EL 〈O〉 ⊥ ontologies to move the axioms with
inﬁnite rank into the TBox. 
Corollary 23. Let K = 〈T , D〉 be a nominal safe EL 〈O〉 ⊥ ontology, with C  ∼D ∈ D . Let T • be the TBox obtained from K after
applying RC.Step 1 , while let (N(T {} )) ∗ be the TBox obtained from N(K {} ) using the ComputeRanking procedure. Then, the
following are equivalent: 
1. C 
 ∼⊥ ∈ T • ; 
2. N(C {} 
 ∼⊥ ) ∈ (N(T {} )) ∗ ; 
3. r K {} (C {} 
 ∼D {} ) = ∞ . 
Propositions 20 –22 guarantee that the ranking of concepts (and nominals) done using an EL 〈O〉 ⊥ ontology corresponds
to the ranking over the correspondent ELO ⊥ ontology, while Corollary 23 guarantees that we are correct in using the
ComputeRanking procedure to distinguish the classical part of an ontology from the defeasible part (provided nominal safe-
ness is assumed). 
The next step is now to prove that the classical conclusions that we derive using defeasible nominals correspond to the
conclusions we would derive using classical nominals. So, let K {} = 〈T {} , D {} 〉 be an ELO ⊥ ontology and let D  {} , ∞ := { C 
D | C  ∼D ∈ D {} and r K {} (C  ∼D ) = ∞} ; hence T {} ∪ D  {} , ∞ deﬁnes the classical part of the information contained in K {} . The
following holds. 
Proposition 24. Let K = 〈T , D〉 be a nominal safe EL 〈O〉 ⊥ ontology. For every safe GCI C  D , we have that the following are
equivalent: 
1. C  D is in the RC of K ; 
2. N ( C {}  D {} ) is in the RC of N(K {} ) ; 
3. T {} ∪ D  {} , ∞ | C {}  D {} . 
This proves that, under the nominal safeness assumption (i) entailments about classical GCIs in EL 〈O〉 ⊥ are the same as
for ELO ⊥ ; (ii) all the decision procedures we have introduced in the previous sections can be applied without any change
to EL 〈O〉 ⊥ ontologies, provided that we replace defeasible nominals with fresh concept names ; and (iii) the results connected to
the computational complexity shown in the previous sections remain unchanged. That is, Propositions 14, 15 , and 19 remain
valid for nominal safe EL 〈O〉 ⊥ ontologies as well. 
In relation to the problematic Example 11 , 〈 a 〉  ∼C is interpreted as ‘the most prototypical instantiation of a is an instance
of concept C ’, while 〈 b〉  ∼C is interpreted as ‘the most prototypical instantiation of b is instance of C ’. That is, we are not
inferring that it is possible to have a model where we have at the same time a unique object representing the prototypical
a and a unique object representing the prototypical b (i.e., they are both in the lowest layer of the model), but rather that
both the most prototypical interpretation of a and the most prototypical interpretation of b are in the layer 0. The following
example illustrates the details. 
Example 13. Consider the ontology in Example 11 . Its translation in EL 〈O〉 ⊥ is K 〈〉 = 〈T 〈〉 , D 〈〉 〉 and, thus, 
T 〈〉 = { 〈 a 〉  ∃ r. 〈 b〉 , C  D  ⊥} 
D 〈〉 = D = {  ∼C, ∃ r.C  ∼D } . 
As for K, D 〈〉 is partitioned by the ranking procedure into D 0 = {  ∼C} and D 1 = {∃ r.C  ∼D } . Now, both 〈 a 〉 and 〈 b 〉 have
rank 0 as 
T ∗〈〉 ,δ0 | 〈 a 〉  δ0  ⊥ 
T ∗〈〉 ,δ0 | 〈 b〉  δ0  ⊥ 
hold. Furthermore, as 
T ∗〈〉 ,δ0 | 〈 a 〉  δ0  C 
T ∗〈〉 ,δ0 | 〈 b〉  δ0  C 
hold, we can infer both 〈 a 〉  ∼C and 〈 b〉  ∼C . But now, as defeasible nominals are interpreted as atomic concepts, we cannot
infer 〈 a 〉  ∼D anymore and, consequently, we do not derive 〈 a 〉  ∼⊥ . 
Essentially, since defeasible nominals are interpreted as sets of individuals, we conclude that the most prototypical inter-
pretation of individual a is an instance of C , and the most prototypical interpretation of b is instance of C as well. However,
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 we are not forced to relate through role r the most prototypical interpretation of a to the most prototypical interpretation
of b : in fact, as 〈 a 〉∃ r . 〈 b 〉 holds, the most prototypical elements of 〈 a 〉 can be related to exceptional interpretations of b .
That is, to individuals of 〈 b 〉 with a rank higher than 0 and not being an instance of C . 
For further insights, we refer the reader to Appendix B and, speciﬁcally, to Proposition 32 . 
6. Related work 
While there has been extensive work by now related to non-monotonic DLs, such as [2,4,8,10,11,13,14,19,23,27,29,31,50] ,
we will focus here on low-complexity non-monotonic DLs extensions only. We refer the reader to e.g. [8,27] , in order to
avoid an unnecessary replication, for a general in-depth discussion on non-monotone DLs and their characteristics. Also,
but somewhat less related, are approaches based on some form of integration of non-monotone logic programs with DLs,
as [20,33,34,36,42–44,47] , although we will not address them here, except for those cases involving tractable computational
complexity. 
We believe that our results are signiﬁcant. Indeed, let us recap that non-monotonic DLs extensions involving low-
complexity DLs, such as [5–7,9,12–16,19,21,24,25] , only in few cases the tractability of the underlying DL is preserved [5–
8,30] . 
Speciﬁcally, [7] considers circumscription in low-complexity DLs such as DL-Lite [1] and EL and identiﬁes few fragments
whose computational complexity of the decision problem at hand is in PTime . That is, deciding subsumption, instance check-
ing and concept consistency decision problems are in PTime for Circ f ix (LL EL ) , i.e. Left Local EL ⊥ 15 under circumscription
with ﬁxed atomic concepts. The same holds for Circ v ar ( EL ) , where all atomic concepts are varying as circumscription col-
lapses to classical EL reasoning. The work [5] follows the same spirit of [7] , by considering EL with default attributes ,
i.e. defeasible GCIs of the form A 
 ∼∃ r.B under circumscription with ﬁxed atomic concepts, but where KBs are assumed to
be conﬂict safe and without assertions. In that case, [5] shows that one may determine the set of normalised concepts sub-
suming a given concept in polynomial time. These results have been extended in [6] , where EL ++ [3] has been considered
in place of EL ⊥ , but requiring a further adaption of the conﬂict safe notion. In [8] a non-monotone extension of DLs is
proposed based on a notion of overriding and supporting normality concepts of the form N C that denote the prototypi-
cal/normal instances of a concept C . Defeasible GCIs are of the form C 
 ∼D, with a priority relation ≺ among such GCIs and
intended meaning: “normally the instances of C are instances of D , unless stated otherwise” meaning that higher-priority
defeasible GCI may override C 
 ∼D . A remarkable feature of this proposal is that the reasoning problems are tractable for any
underlying tractable classical DL, as the reasoning algorithm, as for our case, is built up on a sequence of DL subsumption
tests. 
In [30] , the DL SROEL ( , ×) R T is proposed, i.e. the DL SROEL ( , ×) [38] extended with typicality concepts T ( C ), whose
instances are intended to be the typical C elements. A defeasible GCI C 
 ∼D can be expressed in SROEL ( , ×) R T as T ( C )  D ,
meaning that “the typical C elements are Ds”, but additionally, SROEL ( , ×) R T allows to express also e.g. D  T ( C ) (“the Cs
are typical elements of Ds”). In summary, in this work, the authors show that 
1. the instance checking problem under minimal entailment is p 
2 
-hard for SROEL ( , ×) R T . 
2. the instance checking problem under rational entailment and rational closure 16 is in PTime for SROEL ( , ×) R T . The au-
thors propose to extend the Datalog set of rules for SROEL ( , ×) [38] with an appropriate set of stratiﬁed Datalog rules
with negation to deal with the typicality operator. Additionally, the authors point to the fact that the correspondence be-
tween the rational closure construction and the canonical minimal model semantics in [29] is lost if e.g. nominals occur
in an ontology and, thus, a semantical characterisation is missing so far. 
Let us note that a major difference with our approach is that we may rely entirely on an EL ⊥ reasoner as black box,
while this is not true for the Datalog encoding of SROEL ( , ×) R T , as in the latter case there are interacting rules between
rules dealing with defeasible knowledge and the set of rules for SROEL ( , ×) [38] . 
In [48] an extension of RC and Relevant Closure [15] for EL ⊥ has been proposed, in order to maximise also the typicality
of the concepts that are under the scope of an existential quantiﬁcation. The proposal is in line with the expressivity of the
proposal in [8] , uses the ranking procedure deﬁned for ALC as presented in Section 2.2 and, thus, the procedure does not
run in polynomial time. 17 
Concerning the somewhat related ‘hybrid’ approaches, i.e. those that in some way combine non-monotone logic pro-
grams with (low-complexity) DLs, there are some results that still preserve tractability (but only w.r.t. data complexity),
such as [20,33,34,36,42–44] . Very roughly, in these works data complexity tractability is preserved for some form of hy-
brid normal logic programs under some well-founded semantics, provided that the underlying DL has a tractable instance
checking procedure. 15 Roughly, left-hand sides of GCIs contain no qualiﬁed existential restrictions and defeasible axioms are syntactically of the form A 
 ∼∃ r.B . 
16 In this case, a knowledge base has to be simple , i.e. the typicality operator T occurs on the left of a GCI only. 
17 By personal communication, we were informed that in [49] a similar construction as the one proposed in Equation (3) (and, thus, like the one proposed 
in [18] ) to determine exceptionality for EL ⊥ has been described. 
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 7. Conclusions 
Contribution We have shown that the subsumption problem under RC in EL ⊥ can be decided in polynomial time, as is
the case for the monotone counterpart, via a polynomial number of classical EL ⊥ subsumption tests and, thus, can be imple-
mented by relying on any current reasoners for EL ⊥ . Furthermore, we have adapted the algorithm also to one reﬁnement of
RC for DLs, Defeasible Inheritance-based Closure, that overcomes the drowning effect, a main RC’s inferential limit, showing
that the subsumption problem remains polynomial. We also have presented a novel, polynomial time decision procedure
to deal with nominals. To this end, we propose the introduction of the notion of defeasible nominals , which is compatible
with monotone classical nominal safe ELO ⊥ . The main result here is that we may still use the RC procedure presented
for EL ⊥ (and its extension) to deal with nominal safe ELO ⊥ without an increase in the computational complexity of the
subsumption problem. 
Future Work Concerning future work, one of our aims is to determine whether the subsumption problem under RC still
remains polynomial for various other tractable DLs such as those of the DL-Lite family [1] and those of the so-called Horn-DL
family [39] , which are at the core of the OWL 2 proﬁles OWL QL and OWL RL, respectively. Another direction is to implement
our method and test it in a similar way as done in [12,46] , where the latter conﬁrmed that the use of DL reasoners as a
black box is scalable in practice. 
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Appendix A. Characteristic DL model for rational closure 
In [12, Section 5] the following DL model characterising rational closure for ALC is introduced. Let K = 〈T , D〉 be a
defeasible ontology and R K be the set of all the ranked models of K . Let  be any countable inﬁnite domain, and R K 

be the set of ranked models of K that have  as domain. We can use the set of models R K 

to deﬁne a single model
characterising rational closure. Let R ∪ K = 〈 R ∪ K , ·R ∪ K , ≺R ∪ K 〉 be a ranked model obtained in the following way. 
• For the domain R 
∪ 
K , we consider in R 
∪ 
K one copy of  for each model in R K 

. Speciﬁcally, given  = { x, y . . . } , we
indicate as R = { x R , y R , . . . } a copy of the domain  associated with an interpretation R ∈ R K  and deﬁne 
R 
∪ 
K = 
⋃ 
R ∈ R K 

R . 
• The interpretation function and the preferential relation are deﬁned referring directly to the models in R K 

. That is, for
every x R , y R ′ ∈ R 
∪ 
K , every atomic concept A and every role r , 
• x R ∈ A R 
∪ 
K iff x ∈ A R ; 
• (x R , y R ′ ) ∈ r R 
∪ 
K iff R = R ′ and ( x , y ) ∈ r R ; 
• x R ≺R 
∪ 
K y R ′ iff h R (x ) < h R ′ (y ) . 
It is easy to check by induction on the construction of the concepts that, for every x R ∈ R 
∪ 
K and every concept C , 
• x R ∈ C R 
∪ 
K iff x ∈ C R ; 
and that every individual x R ∈ R 
∪ 
K preserves its original height, that is, 
• h R ∪ K 
(x R ) = h R (x ) . 
R ∪ K is a ranked model characterising the Rational Closure of K [12, Theorem 4 and Corollary 1] . That is, given a KB
K = 〈T , D〉 , for every concept inclusion C  ∼D, 
C 
 ∼D is in the RC of K iff R ∪ K | C  ∼D. (A.1)
Remark 10. From now on, given a set of ranked models S , we will indicate the model obtained using a procedure like the
one used here above as the ranked merge of the models in S . That is, R ∪ K is the ranked merge of the models in R 
K 

. 
In [12, Theorem 4] the correspondence of  rc with the model R ∪ K has been proved. That is, for every ALC KB K = 〈T , D〉
and every inclusion C 
 ∼D (resp. C  D ), K  rc C  ∼D (resp., K  rc C  D ) iff R ∪ K | C  ∼D (resp., R ∪ K | C  D ). 
In what follows we are going to prove that the above characterisation of RC using the model R ∪ K is equivalent to the one
introduced in [29] , which we will use then in Appendix B . The following results are valid for DL languages more expressive
than EL ⊥ , but not containing nominals, as e.g. for ALC . 
First we restrict our attention to a subset of the models in R K 

. Speciﬁcally, those that are: 
1. minimal w.r.t. the relation < , as deﬁned in [29] and reported here as Deﬁnition 6 . 2. canonical , as deﬁned in [29] , which we report below for the sake of completeness. 
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 Deﬁnition 9 ( [29] , Deﬁnition 24) . Let K = 〈T , D〉 be a knowledge base in defeasible ALC , and S be the set of concepts
appearing in K . A ranked model R = 〈 R , ·R , ≺R 〉 of K is a canonical model if, for every set of concepts { C 1 , . . . , C n } ⊆ S 
consistent with K there is at least an x ∈ R s.t. x ∈ (C 1  . . .  C n ) R . 
Let min c < (R 
K 

) (resp. min c < (R 
K ) ) be the set of the minimal models in R K 

(resp. R K ) w.r.t. < that are also canonical.
The following proposition shows that, for every concept C , every canonical minimal model in R K associates to C the same
height. 
Proposition 25. For every R , R ′ in min c < (R K ) and every concept C , 
h R ′ (C) = h R (C) . 
Proof. Given two ranked interpretations R = 〈 R , ·R , ≺R 〉 and R ′ = 〈 R ′ , ·R ′ , ≺R ′ 〉 and an ontology K = 〈T , D〉 , let 	K be the
set of the subconcepts appearing in K and, for o ∈ R , let [ o R K ] R ′ = { o ′ ∈ R ′ | for every concept C ∈ 	, o ∈ C R iff o ′ ∈ C R ′ } .
Also, let h R ′ ([ o R K ] R ′ ) = min { h R ′ (o ′ ) | o ′ ∈ [ o R K ] R ′ } . 
Assume to the contrary that there are two R, R ′ ∈ min c < (R K ) and a concept C s.t. h R ′ (C) < h R (C) . Since R , R ′ are canoni-
cal, this implies that for some o ∈ C R there is an object o ′ ∈ [ o R K ] R ′ s.t. h R ′ (o ′ ) < h R (o) . 
Let R ∗ = 〈 R ∗ , ·R ∗ , ≺R ∗ 〉 be s.t. R ∗ = R , ·R ∗ = ·R , and, for every o ∈ R ∗ h R ∗ (o) = min { h R (o) , h R ′ ([ o R K ] R ′ ) } . It is easy to
check that R ∗ is a model of K : ﬁrst check by induction on the construction of the concepts that for every o ∈ R ∗ and for
every concept C , o ∈ C R ∗ iff o ∈ C R ; then it follows that for every strict inclusion C  D , R ∗C  D iff R C  D ; eventually, using
the deﬁnition of h R ∗ (o) , we can prove that for every C 
 ∼D ∈ D, h R ∗ (C  D ) < h R ∗ (C  ¬ D ) or h R ∗ (C) = ∞ . So R ∗ is a model
of K and R ∗ < R , against the hypothesis that R ∈ min c < (R K ) . 
We can prove easily that also the following lemma holds. Let R 
∪ c , min 
K be the ranked merge of min 
c 
< (R 
K 

) . 
Lemma 26. For every KB K = 〈T , D〉 and every concept C , 
h R ∪ K (C) = h R ∪ c , min K (C) . 
Proof. For every concept C , h R ∪ K 
(C) = h R (C) for some R ∈ min < (R K ) , that is, some R ∈ R K  that is minimal w.r.t. < . We
have to prove that if there is a model R ∈ min < (R K ) s.t. h R ∪ K (C) = h R (C) , then there must be a model R 
′ ∈ min c < (R K ) s.t.
h R ∪ K 
(C) = h R ′ (C) . 
Let R ∗ be a model in min c < (R K ) , and R 
∗∗ be the ranked merge of R and R ∗; it is easy to prove that R ∗∗ is still a model
of K, and in particular it must be a minimal canonical model of K : it must be minimal, otherwise R and R ∗ would not be
minimal, and it must be canonical, since R ∗ is canonical. Hence, for every concept C , h R ∗∗ (C) = min { h R (C ) , h R ∗ (C ) } ≤ h R ∪ K (C) ,
and, since R ∗ is merged into R ∪ K , h R ∗∗ (C) = h R ∪ K (C) . Also, the domain of R 
∗∗, R ∗∗ , must be countably inﬁnite, since it is
obtained by merging two countably inﬁnite domains. 
Since R 
∗∗
is countably inﬁnite, we can deﬁne a bijection b between R 
∗∗
and , and using b we can deﬁne a model
R ∗∗

corresponding to R ∗∗ but having  as domain (that is, for every C  ∼D, R ∗∗ | C  ∼D iff R ∗∗

| C  ∼D ); it is suﬃcient to
deﬁne ·R ∗∗ as: 
• for every A ∈ N C , A R 
∗∗
 = { o ∈  | b −(o) ∈ A R ∗∗ } ; 
• for every r ∈ N R , r R 
∗∗
 = { (o, o ′ ) ∈  ×  | (b −(o) , b −(o ′ )) ∈ r R ∗∗ } ; 
and for every o ∈ , set h R ∗∗

(o) = h R ∗∗ (b −(o)) . R ∗∗ must be in min c < (R K ) and h R ∗∗ (C) = h R ∪ K (C) . 
So, for every concept C there is a model R ′ ∈ min c < (R K ) s.t. h R ′ (C) = h R ∪ K (C) . By Proposition 25 , that implies that h R (C) =
h R ∪ K 
(C) for every R ∈ min c < (R K ) , that in turn implies that h R ∪ c , min K 
(C) = h R ∪ K (C) for every concept C . 
From Lemma 26 and Deﬁnition 2 it follows that RC can be characterised merging the minimal canonical models of K 
having  as domain. 
Proposition 27. For every inclusion C 
 ∼D, 
R ∪ K | C  ∼D iff R ∪ c , min K | C  ∼D 
Expression A.2 here below corresponds to the semantic characterisation of RC for ALC presented in [27,29] . For every
KB K = 〈T , D〉 and every inclusion C  ∼D, 
C 
 ∼D is in the RC of K iff R | C  ∼D, for every R ∈ min c < (R K ) . (A.2) 
In particular, Expression A.2 is a rephrasing in our framework of Theorem 8 in [29] . We want to prove that, indeed,
our characterisation of RC (Expression A.1 ) is equivalent to the one presented in [29] (Expression A.2 ). First, we prove that,
starting from the Expression A.2 , we can restrict our attention only to the minimal canonical models in R K 

( Lemma 28 );
then ( Proposition 29 ) we are going to prove that such a characterisation corresponds to the one using R 
∪ c , min . K 
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 Lemma 28. For every canonical model R of a KB K = 〈T , D〉 , there is a canonical model R  of K that has a countably inﬁnite
domain  and s.t. for every inclusion axiom C 
 ∼D, R | C  ∼D iff R  | C  ∼D . 
Proof. Let R = 〈 R , ·R , ≺R 〉 be a canonical model of K . The possible cases are three. 
1. R is countably inﬁnite. Then we can build an equivalent model having  as domain and preserving the height of each
concept (see the proof of Lemma 26 ). 
2. R is ﬁnite. Then we can build an equivalent model with a countably inﬁnite domain: just make a countably inﬁnite
number of copies of R and rank-merge them in a single model (that preserves the height of each concept). Then the
result follows from case 1. 
3. R is uncountably inﬁnite. Also, in this case we can build an equivalent model with a countably inﬁnite domain. To
build it we can use the Finite Model Property (FMP, [12, Theorem 7] ) and the Finite Counter-Model Property (FCMP, [12,
Proposition 15] ) that hold for defeasible ALC . The latter indicates that, if there is a model of an ontology K that does
not satisfy an inclusion C 
 ∼D, then there is a ﬁnite model of K that does not satisfy C  ∼D . 
FMP and FCMP are based on the following construction [12, pp. 78-79] : let 	 be a set of concepts { C 1 , . . . , C n } s.t. 	 is
obtained closing under sub-concepts and negation the concepts appearing in K (plus the concepts C and D , if we are
looking for a model of K that also falsiﬁes C  ∼D ). Now we deﬁne the equivalence relation ∼	 as 
∀ x, y ∈ R , x ∼	 y iff ∀ C ∈ 	, x ∈ C R iff y ∈ C R . 
We indicate with [ x ] 	 the equivalence class of the individuals that are related to an individual x through ∼	 : 
[ x ] 	 = { y ∈ R | x ∼	 y } . 
We introduce a new model R ′ = 〈 R ′ , ·R ′ , ≺R ′ 〉 , deﬁned as: 
• R 
′ = { [ x ] 	 | x ∈ R } ; 
• for every A ∈ N C ∩ 	, A R ′ = { [ x ] 	 | x ∈ A R } ; 
• for every A / ∈ N C ∩ 	, A R ′ = ∅ ; 
• for every r ∈ N R , r R ′ = {〈 [ x ] 	, [ y ] 	〉 | 〈 x, y 〉 ∈ r R } ; 
• For every [ x ] 	, [ y ] 	 ∈ R ′ , [ x ] 	 ≺R ′ [ y ] 	 if there is an object z ∈ [ x ] 	 s.t. for all v ∈ [ y ] 	, z ≺R v ; 
• for every a ∈ N I , a R ′ = [ x ] 	 iff a R = x . 
It is easy to see that this construction gives back a ranked interpretation that preserves the relative height of the con-
cepts, that is, for every C , D ∈ 	, h R ′ (C) ≤ h R ′ (D ) iff h R ( C ) ≤h R ( D ). Also, since the set S in Deﬁnition 9 is a subset of 	,
also canonicity is preserved. 
Now, given the model R , let 
 ∼−R = { C  ∼D | R | C  ∼D } . Since we have assumed a ﬁnitely generated vocabulary (see
Section 2.1 ), we will have a countably inﬁnite number of inclusion statements that can be generated (this can be proven
using some Gödel-style numerical encoding of the inclusions); hence 
 ∼−R must be countably inﬁnite too (it cannot be a
ﬁnite set, since it is easy to check that for every inclusion there is in our language an inﬁnite number of inclusions that
are logically equivalent to it). 
For each inclusion C 
 ∼D in  ∼−R , take a ﬁnite model R C  ∼D of K that falsiﬁes C 
 ∼D . Let R ∗ be the interpretation obtained
by merging all the models R 
C 
 ∼D , with C 
 ∼D ∈  ∼−R . It is easy to check that R ∗ is a model of K that satisﬁes the desired
constraints and has a countably inﬁnite domain (it is obtained by merging a countably inﬁnite number of ﬁnite models).
Then, the result follows from case 1. 

We can now prove that in Expression A.2 we can restrict our attention from all the minimal canonical models of an
ontology K (that is, the minimal canonical models in R K ) to the minimal canonical models of K having  as domain
(that is, the minimal canonical models in R K 

). Indeed, the following proposition follows immediately from Lemma 28 . 
Proposition 29. For every KB K = 〈T , D〉 and every inclusion C  ∼D, R | C  ∼D for every model R ∈ min c < (R K ) iff R ′ | C  ∼D 
for every model R ′ ∈ min c < (R K ) . 
Now, the correspondence between our semantics for RC (Expression A.1 ) and the one presented in [29] (Expression A.2 )
follows. 
Proposition 30. model R ∈ min c < (R K ) if and only if R ∪ K | C  ∼D . Expression A.1 and Expression A.2 are equivalent. 
Proof. The following holds: 
C 
 ∼D is in the RC of K iff R ∪ K | C  ∼D (ExpressionA. 1) 
iff R 
∪ c , min 
K | C  ∼D (P roposition 27) 
iff R | C  ∼D for every R ∈ min c < (R K ) (P roposition 25) 
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 iff R | C  ∼D for every R ∈ min c < (R K ) (P roposition 29) 
iff C 
 ∼D is in the RC of K (accordingtoExpressionA. 2) , 
which concludes. 
Appendix B. Prototypicalreasoning over the individuals 
As shown in Example 11 , once we introduce presumptive reasoning involving individuals, we are faced with the possibil-
ity of multiple minimal conﬁgurations. Such an observation allows us to distinguish two kinds of reasoning concerning the
individuals (see Section 5 ): one is a presumptive reasoning, modelled by a skeptical approach that takes under consideration
what holds in all the most typical situations satisfying our KB; the second possible approach is to take under consideration
only the most typical instantiations of the individual we are interested in. That is, we attribute presumptively a property C
to an individual a if a falls under C in all the models in which a is interpreted in the most prototypical way. Given a nominal
safe ELO ⊥ ontology K = 〈T , D〉 and an individual a ∈ N O , the latter kind of reasoning would correspond to taking under
consideration only those minimal models of K in which also the interpretation of a is minimal. 
In Appendix A we have modelled our reasoning using R ∪ K , R 
∪ c , min 
K , or, equivalently, min 
c 
< (R 
K 

) , that are equivalent
options to characterise the RC of a KB, if we do not allow nominals. 
We can extend the deﬁnition of < , and hence the deﬁnition of min c < (R 
K 

) , also to languages containing nominals. As
Example 11 shows, Proposition 25 does not hold for the minimal models of ontologies that have also nominals: in such an
example we would have that in some minimal models { a } is interpreted on layer 0 and { b } on layer 1, and in other minimal
models the other way around. Therefore, in presence of nominals, we have two options regarding the kind of minimality we
want to use. On one hand we can continue to use a notion of entailment relation rc built using the entire set of models in
min c < (R 
K 

) as done in [12,14] . That is: 
Deﬁnition 10. K |rc C  ∼D iff R | C  ∼D for every R ∈ min c < (R K ) . 
Another option, and which is what we are going to analyse here, is more appropriate for modelling prototypical reason-
ing. If we are investigating about which properties are to be associated to the prototype of a certain individual a , we consider
only the minimal models in which a is interpreted in the lowest possible layer. That is, if we are wondering whether some
inclusion { a }  ∼C holds, we do not refer to all the models in min c < (R K ) , but only to those models in which the individ-
ual a is interpreted at its minimal height. Speciﬁcally, let us deﬁne R ∈ min c ,a < (R K ) iff R ∈ min c < (R K ) and h R (a ) ≤ h R ′ (a ) 
for every R ′ ∈ min c < (R K ) . Based on this notion, we can now deﬁne a different consequence relation |′ rc to reason about
nominals. 
Deﬁnition 11. K |′ rc { a }  ∼C iff a R ∈ C R for every R ∈ min c ,a < (R K ) . 
To illustrate the difference between |′ rc and rc , consider the knowledge base in Example 11 . According to |′ rc we
consider only the models in which a is at rank 0 if we are asking something about a (for example, whether the prototype of
a satisﬁes C ), while we consider only the models in which b is at rank 0, if we are asking something about b (for example, if
the prototype of b satisﬁes C ). According to rc , we neither can conclude that presumably a satisﬁes C nor that presumably b
satisﬁes C (each of them is falsiﬁed in some typical situations), while according to |′ rc we can conclude that the prototypes
of both a and b satisfy C (in the preferred situations w.r.t. a , a falls under C , and analogously for b ). 
We can generalise the deﬁnition of |′ rc to the entire language of nominal-safe ELO ⊥ . Speciﬁcally, given a nominal safe
ontology K = 〈T , D〉 , a ranked model R of K, and an n-safe concept C , let us deﬁne R ∈ min c ,C < (R K ) iff R ∈ min c < (R K ) 
and for every model R ′ ∈ min c < (R K ) , h R (C) ≤ h R ′ (C) . Then, Deﬁnition 11 can be generalised as follows. 
Deﬁnition 12. Given a nominal safe ELO ⊥ ontology K = 〈T , D〉 and a safe inclusion C  ∼D, K |′ rc C  ∼D iff min ≺R (C R ) ⊆ D R 
for every R ∈ min c ,C < (R K ) . 
Note that if we are not using nominals, that is, we are using EL ⊥ , there is no difference between rc and |′ rc , since
they both correspond to RC entailment. 
Proposition 31. Given a defeasible EL ⊥ ontology K = 〈T , D〉 and an EL ⊥ inclusion C  ∼D, then K |′ rc C  ∼D iff K |rc C  ∼D iff
K  rc C  ∼D . 
Proof. The correspondence between |′ rc and rc in EL ⊥ is an immediate consequence of Proposition 25 . The correspon-
dence between  rc and Expression A.1 has been proved in [12, Theorem 4] , Proposition 30 proves the correspondence be-
tween Expression A.1 and Expression A.2 , and Expression A.2 corresponds to rc by Deﬁnition 10 . 
We can now prove that the decision procedure deﬁned in Section 5 using defeasible nominals corresponds to prototypical
reasoning over the individuals, that is, it corresponds exactly to |′ rc . 
Proposition 32. Let K = 〈T , D〉 be a nominal safe ELO ⊥ ontology. For every safe C  ∼D, K |′ rc C  ∼D iff K 〈〉  rc C 〈〉  ∼D 〈〉 . 
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 Proof. Since K 〈〉 and C 〈〉 
 ∼D 〈〉 are EL ⊥ expressions, by Proposition 31 , K 〈〉  rc C 〈〉  ∼D 〈〉 iff K 〈〉 |′ rc C 〈〉  ∼D 〈〉 . So, it is suﬃcient
to prove that for every safe C 
 ∼D, K |′ rc C  ∼D iff K 〈〉 |′ rc C 〈〉  ∼D 〈〉 . 
( ⇐ ). Assume K 〈〉 |′ rc C 〈〉  ∼D 〈〉 . Consider each model R in min c ,C < (R K ) and extend its interpretation function · R by impos-
ing that, for every a ∈ N O , 〈 a 〉 R = { a } R : R becomes also a model of K 〈〉 and it must hold that R ∈ min c ,C 〈〉 < (R K 〈〉 ) . Assume
the latter is not the case: then there is an R ∗ ∈ min c ,C 〈〉 < (R K 〈〉 ) s.t. R ∗ < R ; extend ·R ∗ s.t., for every a ∈ N O , { a } R ∗ = 〈 a 〉 R ∗
(Since R ∗ < R , it must be 〈 a 〉 R ∗ = 〈 a 〉 R , hence also in R ∗ every defeasible nominal is interpreted into a single object), and
then we have R ∗ ∈ R K with R ∗ < R , contrary to the assumption R in min c ,C < (R K ) . 
Therefore, since every R in min c ,C < (R 
K ) is also in min 
c ,C 〈〉 
< (R 
K 〈〉 ) , K 〈〉 |′ rc C 〈〉  ∼D 〈〉 implies that R | C 〈〉  ∼D 〈〉 and, since in
every such R , for every a ∈ N O , 〈 a 〉 R = { a } R , R | C  ∼D follows and we can conclude K |′ rc C  ∼D . 
( ⇒ ). Assume K 〈〉 |′ rc C 〈〉  ∼D 〈〉 . We need to prove that K |′ rc C  ∼D . 
K 〈〉 |′ rc C 〈〉  ∼D 〈〉 implies that there is a model R = 〈 R , ·R , ≺R 〉 in min c ,C 〈〉 < (R K 〈〉 ) s.t. R | C 〈〉  ∼D 〈〉 , and we need to prove
that there is a model R ∗ in min c ,C < (R K ) s.t. R ∗ | C  ∼D . 
From R we deﬁne a ranked interpretation R ′ = 〈 R ′ , ·R ′ , ≺R ′ 〉 using the procedure explained in the proof of Lemma 34 .
Speciﬁcally, 18 
• R 
′ = { x •E , x E | R | E  ⊥ , where E is a safe EL 〈O〉 ⊥ concept } ∪ { x 〈 a 〉 | a ∈ N O } ; 
• 〈 a 〉 R ′ = { x 〈 a 〉 ∈ R ′ } , for every defeasible nominal 〈 a 〉 ; 
• A R 
′ = { x E ∈ R ′ | R | E  A } ∪ { x •E ∈ R ′ | R | E  ∼A } ∪ { x 〈 a 〉 ∈ R ′ | R | 〈 a 〉  ∼A } , for every safe EL 〈O〉 ⊥ concept E , every
defeasible nominal 〈 a 〉 , and every atomic EL ⊥ concept A ; 
• r R 
′ = {〈 x E , x F 〉 ∈ R ′ × R ′ | R | E  ∃ r.F } ∪ {〈 x •E , x F 〉 ∈ R ′ × R ′ | R | E  ∼∃ r.F } ∪ {〈 x 〈 a 〉 , x F 〉 ∈ R ′ × R ′ | R | 〈 a 〉  ∼∃ r.F } , 
for every safe EL 〈O〉 ⊥ concepts E and F , and every defeasible nominal 〈 a 〉 ; 
• h R ′ (x •E ) = h R (E) , for every x •E ∈ R 
′ 
; 
• h R ′ (x 〈 a 〉 ) = h R ( 〈 a 〉 ) , for every defeasible nominal 〈 a 〉 ; 
• x •F ≺R ′ x E for every x •F , x E ∈ R ′ . 
We have proved in the proof of Lemma 34 that R ′ is still a model of K 〈〉 . Speciﬁcally, for every pair of safe EL 〈O〉 ⊥ 
concepts E , F , we have 
1. R E  F and R | E  ⊥ iff x E ∈ F R ′ ; 
2. R | E  ∼F and R | E  ⊥ iff x •E ∈ F R ′ . 
And, for every pair 〈 a 〉 , E where a ∈ N O and E is safe , we have, 
3. R | 〈 a 〉  ∼E iff x 〈 a 〉 ∈ E R ′ . 
This implies that for every safe concept E such that R | E  ⊥ , x •E , x E ∈ E R ′ , and for every 〈 a 〉 , 〈 a 〉 R ′ = { x 〈 a 〉 } . Moreover,
by construction of R ′ , for every safe concept E 〈〉 , x E ∈ min R 
′ 
≺ (E R 
′ 
〈〉 ) (otherwise it is easy to obtain a contradiction using 2. and
3.) and, consequently, h R ′ (E 〈〉 ) = h R (E 〈〉 ) . We can conclude that R ′ is a model of K 〈〉 s.t. R ′ | C 〈〉  ∼D 〈〉 . Since in R ′ every
defeasible nominal 〈 a 〉 is interpreted into a single object, extending ·R ′ by imposing that, for every a ∈ N O , { a } R ′ = 〈 a 〉 R ′ =
{ x 〈 a 〉 } , we can conclude that R ′ is a model of K s.t. R ′ | C  ∼D, that is, there is an object o s.t. o ∈ min ≺R ′ (C R 
′ 
) and o / ∈ D R ′
. 
If R ′ is in min c ,C < (R K ) , we conclude our proof. It could be that R ′ / ∈ min c ,C < (R K ) , and, in case, we need to prove that the
existence of R ′ implies the existence of another model R ∗ s.t. R ∗ | C  ∼D with R ∗ in min c ,C < (R K ) . 
So, let R ∗ be a model in min c ,C < (R K ) and such that R ∗ < R ′ ; we have to prove that R ∗ | C  ∼D . 
As above, extend ·R ∗ for defeasible nominals by imposing that, for every a ∈ N O , { a } R ′ = 〈 a 〉 R ′ = { x 〈 a 〉 } = { x 〈 a 〉 } . R ∗ is a
model of K 〈〉 and R ∗ ∈ min c ,C < (R K ) implies R ∗ ∈ min 
c ,C 〈〉 
< (R 
K 〈〉 ) (as shown in the ( ⇐ )-part of this proof). 
By Proposition 25 , since R and R ∗ are both in min 
c ,C 〈〉 
< (R 
K 〈〉 ) , for every safe concept E 〈〉 it holds h R ∗ (E 〈〉 ) = h R (E 〈〉 ) . We
have already seen that for every safe concept E 〈〉 , h R ′ (E 〈〉 ) = h R (E 〈〉 ) . 
Hence we can conclude that, for every safe concept E 〈〉 , h R ∗ (E 〈〉 ) = h R ′ (E 〈〉 ) , that is, for every safe concept E , h R ∗ (E) =
h R ′ (E) . Remember that object o , introduced above, is an object s.t. o ∈ min ≺R ′ (C R 
′ 
) (that is, h R ′ (o) = h R ′ (C) ) and o / ∈ D R 
′ 
.
We have the following: 
• h R ∗ (C) = h R ′ (C) ; 
∗ ′ R ∗ R ∗• since R < R , o ∈ C , o / ∈ D , and h R ∗ (o) ≤ h R ′ (o) . 
18 Recall that we introduce x • E as an object that represents a typical instance of the concept E , while x E represents an atypical instance of the concept E . 
614 G. Casini et al. / Information Sciences 501 (2019) 588–620 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 So, it must be h R ∗ (o) = h R ′ (o) = h R ′ (C) = h R ∗ (C) , that is, also in R ∗ it is the case that o ∈ min ≺R ∗ (C R 
∗
) and o / ∈ D R ∗ . 
Therefore, we can conclude that R ∗ ∈ min c ,C < (R K ) with R ∗ | C  ∼D, and, thus, K |′ rc C  ∼D . 
Appendix C. Various proofs 
Proposition 3 and 4 can be derived from the result [12, Proposition 7] . However, since there are no proper statements and
proofs of them, we add them here for convenience. 
Proposition 3 For every concept C and every ontology K = 〈T , D〉 , if 
T | {¬ E unionsq F | E  ∼F ∈ D}  ¬ C (C.1)
then C is exceptional w.r.t. K . 
Proof. Let K = 〈T , D〉 be an ontology, and assume that T | {¬ E unionsq F | E  ∼F ∈ D}  ¬ C, but C is not exceptional w.r.t. K .
The latter means that there is a ranked interpretation R such that it is a model of K and there is an object o in the lower
layer L R 
0 
of R s.t. o ∈ C R . However, since R is a model of K and o is in the lower layer, for every axiom E  ∼F ∈ D it must be
that either o ∈ E R or o ∈ F R . That is , o ∈ ({¬ E unionsq F | E  ∼F ∈ D}  C) , against T | {¬ E unionsq F | E  ∼F ∈ D}  ¬ C . 
Proposition 4 Given an ontology K • = 〈T •, D •〉 , obtained from the application of RC.Step 1 to an ontology K = 〈T , D〉 , for
every concept C , then 
T • | {¬ E unionsq F | E  ∼F ∈ D •}  ¬ C 
if and only if C is exceptional w.r.t. K • . 
Proof. Let K • = 〈T •, D •〉 be speciﬁed as in the statement. One half of the statement is valid due to Proposition 3 . We have
to prove the other half. 
Assume C is exceptional w.r.t. K •, but T • | {¬ E unionsq F | E  ∼F ∈ D •}  ¬ C . Then there is a classic DL interpretation M =
〈 M , ·M 〉 that is a model of T • and such that there is an object o ∈ ({¬ E unionsq F | E  ∼F ∈ D •}  C) M . 
Now consider the canonical model of the RC of K •, R ∪ K • = 〈 R ∪ K • , ·R ∪ K • , ≺R ∪ K • 〉 , built as described in Appendix A (see
also [12] ). Deﬁne a ranked interpretation R ′ = 〈 R ′ , ·R ′ , ≺R ′ 〉 in the following way: 
• R 
′ = R ∪ K • ∪ M ; 
• for every atomic concept A , A R 
′ = A R ∪ K • ∪ A M ; 
• for every role r , r R 
′ = r R ∪ K • ∪ r M ; 
• for every x ∈ R ∪ K • , h R ′ (x ) = h R ∪ K • (x ) ; 
• for every x ∈ M , h R ′ (x ) = i, if i is the lowest value s.t. x ∈ ( H i ) M , 
where D •
0 
, . . . , D •n is the partition of D • obtained by RC.Step 1 and H i = {¬ E unionsq F | E  ∼F ∈ D •i ∪ . . . ∪ D •n } , as deﬁned in
RC.Step 2 . 
By induction on the construction of the concepts, it is easy to see that for every concept C and for every x ∈ R ′ , x ∈ C R ′ 
iff either x ∈ M and x ∈ C M or x ∈ R ∪ K • and x ∈ C R ∪ K • . Hence R ′ is a model of T • . Now we show that it is also a model
of D • . Assume that there is an axiom E  ∼F ∈ D • s.t. R ′ | E  ∼F ; in particular, let E  ∼F ∈ D •
i 
for some i . That is, there is
an object p ∈ R ′ s.t. p ∈ min ≺
R ′ (E 
R ′ ) and p ∈ (E  ¬ F ) R ′ . As R ∪ K • is a model of K •, it must be that p ∈ M . Due to our
construction of R ′ , it must be h R ′ (p) > i . As R ∪ K • is a minimal canonical model of the RC of K • and E 
 ∼F ∈ D •
i 
, it must be
the case that h R ∪ K •
(E) = i and h R ∪ K • (E  F ) = i (it follows immediately from [12, Proposition 7] , which by construction of R 
′ 
implies h R ′ (E) = i and h R ′ (E  F ) = i . Hence it cannot be the case that p ∈ min ≺R ′ (E R 
′ 
) . Therefore, R ′ must be a model of
K • . 
As a consequence, we end up with an interpretation R ′ that is a ranked model of K •, and such that there is an object
o ∈ ({¬ E unionsq F | E  ∼F ∈ D •}  C) R ′ . Due to our construction of R ′ , the fact that o satisﬁes {¬ E unionsq F | E  ∼F ∈ D •} , that is, H 0 ,
implies that h R ′ (o) = 0 . Therefore, R ′ is a ranked model of K • that has an object satisfying C in the lower layer. Hence C
cannot be exceptional w.r.t. K •, and we have a contradiction. 
Proposition 7 A classical GCI C  D is in the RC of K = 〈T , D〉 iff T • | C  D, where T • has been computed using RC.Step 1
. 
Proof. C  D is in the RC of K = 〈T , D〉 iff also C ¬D ⊥ is in it, that is, iff C  ¬ D  ∼⊥ is in the RC of K = 〈T , D〉 . 
By RC.Step 2 , C  ¬ D  ∼⊥ is in the RC of K = 〈T , D〉 iff one of two following conditions are satisﬁed: 
• there is a concept H i , as deﬁned in RC.Step 2 in Section 2.2 , such that 
T • | H i  ¬ (C  ¬ D ) and 
T • | (C  ¬ D )  H i  ⊥ , 
that is an impossible occurrence; 
G. Casini et al. / Information Sciences 501 (2019) 588–620 615 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 • H C¬ D =  and, thus, T • | (C  ¬ D )  ⊥ , and this must be the case. 

The proofs of Propositions 9 –12 are immediate once we prove the following lemma. 
Lemma 33. Consider any DL that is closed under boolean operators. Given a ﬁnite set of defeasible axioms D and a concept C ,
the following two subsumption tests are equivalent: 
T | {¬ E unionsq F | E  ∼F ∈ D}  ¬ C (C.2)
T ∪ { E  δD  F | E  ∼F ∈ D} | C  δD  ⊥ . (C.3)
where δD is a new atomic concept. 
Proof. It is easily veriﬁed that (C.2) is equivalent to 
T | C   
E 
 ∼F ∈D (¬ E unionsq F )  ⊥ . (C.4)
Therefore, it suﬃces to show the equivalence among (C.4) and (C.3) . 
So, assume (C.4) holds and assume to the contrary that (C.3) does not hold. Then there is an interpretation I such that
I | T , I | E  δD  F , for all E  ∼F ∈ D and o ∈ (C  δD ) I for some o ∈ I , i.e., o ∈ C I and o ∈ δI D . But, I | E  δD  F 
means that I = (¬ E unionsq ¬ δD unionsq F ) I . As o ∈ δI D , o ∈ (¬ E unionsq F ) I follows. It follows that 
o ∈ (C   
E 
 ∼F ∈D (¬ E unionsq F )) 
I , (C.5)
which is absurd as (C.4) holds by assumption 
Conversely, assume that (C.3) holds and assume to the contrary that (C.4) does not hold. Therefore, there is an interpre-
tation I such that I | T and (C.5) holds for some o ∈ I . Now, extend I to δD by setting 
δI D = ( E  ∼F ∈D (¬ E unionsq F )) 
I . 
Note that o ∈ δI D . Then, by construction I | E  δD  F , for all E  ∼F ∈ D holds. Therefore, I is a model of the antecedent
in (C.3) with o ∈ (C  δD ) I , which is absurd as (C.3) holds by assumption. 
Proposition 9 For every concept C and every ontology K = 〈T , D〉 , if 
T δD | C  δD  ⊥ , (C.6)
where δD is a new atomic concept, then C is exceptional w.r.t. K . 
Proof. It is an immediate consequence of Lemma 33 and Proposition 3 . 
Proposition 10 Consider an ontology K = 〈T , D〉 . Then ComputeRanking (K) returns the ontology 〈T ∗, D ∗〉 , where D ∗ is
partitioned into a sequence D 0 , . . . , D n , where T ∗, D ∗ and all D i are equal to the sets T •, D • and D •0 , . . . , D •n obtained via
RC.Step 1 . 
Proof. By Lemma 33 , e (T ′ , E ′ ) is the same set retuned by Exceptional (T ′ , E ′ ) , for any T ′ and E ′ . Now, the only difference
between RC.Step 1 and ComputeRanking procedures is in the way to compute the exceptional concepts. But, since these are
the same, ComputeRanking (K) returns the ontology 〈T ∗, D ∗〉 , where D ∗ is partitioned into a sequence D 0 , . . . , D n , where
T ∗, D ∗ and all D i are equal to the sets T •, D • and D •0 , . . . , D •n obtained via RC.Step 1 . 
Proposition 11 Given an ontology K ∗ = 〈T ∗, D ∗〉 , obtained from the application of the procedure ComputeRanking to an
ontology K = 〈T , D〉 , for every concept C , 
T ∗δD ∗ | C  δD ∗  ⊥ , 
if and only if C is exceptional w.r.t. K ∗ . 
Proof. It is an immediate consequence of Lemma 33, Proposition 4 and Proposition 10 . 
Proposition 12 By referring to Remark 7 , the subsumption test ( 6 ) (resp. 7 ) is equivalent to the subsumption test ( 8 ) (resp. 9 ). 
Proof. As in Sections 2.2 and 3 , E i = D i ∪ . . . ∪ D n and H i = {¬ E unionsq F | E  ∼F ∈ E i } . We have to show that both the two sub-
sumption tests 
T ∗ | H i  ¬ C (C.7)
T ∗ ∪ { E  δ  F | E  ∼F ∈ E } | C  δ  ⊥ (C.8)i i i 
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 are equivalent, and that 
T ∗ | C  H i  D (C.9) 
T ∗ ∪ { E  δi  F | E  ∼F ∈ E i } | C  δi  D (C.10) 
are equivalent. The proof is essentially the same as for Lemma 33 . For illustrative purpose, we show that (C.7) and (C.8) are
equivalent. The other case can be shown in a similar way. 
Assume (C.7) holds. Let us show that (C.8) holds as well. By (C.7) , there is a model I of T ∗ with 
o ∈ (C   
E 
 ∼F ∈E i 
(¬ E unionsq F )) I , (C.11) 
for some o ∈ I . Now, let us extend I to δi by deﬁning 
δI i = ( E  ∼F ∈E i (¬ E unionsq F )) 
I . 
Note that by deﬁnition o ∈ C I and o ∈ δI 
i 
. By construction, I | E  δi  F , for all E  ∼F ∈ E i . Therefore, I is a model of the
antecedent in (C.8) with o ∈ (C  δi ) I and, thus, (C.8) holds. 
Vice-versa, assume (C.8) holds. Let us show that (C.7) holds as well. By (C.8) , there is a model I of T ∗ such that
I | E  δi  F , for all E  ∼F ∈ E i and o ∈ (C  δi ) I for some o ∈ I , i.e., o ∈ C I and o ∈ δI i . But, I | E  δi  F means that
I = (¬ E unionsq ¬ δi unionsq F ) I . As o ∈ δI i , o ∈ (¬ E unionsq F ) I follows. Therefore, 
o ∈ ( 
E 
 ∼F ∈E i 
(¬ E unionsq F )) I (C.12) 
with o ∈ C I and, thus, (C.7) holds. 
Proposition 16 Given an ontology K = 〈T , D〉 , C  ∼D ∈ D and the corresponding ontology in normal form K ′ = 〈T ′ , D ′ 〉 , 
then C is exceptional w.r.t. K iff A C is exceptional w.r.t. K ′ , where A C is the new atomic concept introduced by the normalisation
procedure to replace C 
 ∼D with A C  ∼A D . 
Proof. By Proposition 9 we have that C is exceptional w.r.t. K iff T δD | C  δD  ⊥ , where δD is a new atomic concept.
From this it suﬃces to show that T δD | C  δD  ⊥ iff T ′ δD | A C  δD  ⊥ . 
So, let 〈T + , D + 〉 the KB obtained adding to T the axioms A E = E and A F = F for every axiom E  ∼F ∈ D ( A E , A F being
new atomic concepts), while D + is obtained by replacing in D every axiom E  ∼F with A E  ∼A F . Now, let us prove that
T δD | C  δD  ⊥ iff T + δD | A C  δD  ⊥ . 
The proof from left to right is immediate: assume I | T + 
δD 
. Then I | A C = C, I | T δD and, thus, I | C  δD  ⊥ and
I | A C  δD  ⊥ . 
From right to left, if T δD | C  δD  ⊥ then there is a model I of T δD (that interprets only the concepts appearing in
T δD ) s.t. (C  δ0 ) I  = ∅ . Now, extend the interpretation function ·I of I in such a way that A I E = E I for all E 
 ∼F ∈ D ; Then
I | T + 
δD 
with (A C  δD ) I  = ∅ and, thus, T + δD | A C  δD  ⊥ . 
Since T ′ 
δD 
is the normal form of T + 
δD 
, that preserves satisfaction, it follows that for every C 
 ∼D ∈ D, T δD | C  δ0  ⊥ 
iff T ′ 
δD 
| A C  δ0  ⊥ , which concludes the proof. 
Proposition 18 Let K = 〈T , D〉 and K ′ = 〈T ′ , D ′ 〉 be rank equivalent. for every EL ⊥ defeasible GCI C  ∼D, C  ∼D is in the RC
of K iff C  ∼D is in the RC of K ′ . 
Proof. In the following, we refer to the semantic construction in Appendix A . Now, K = 〈T , D〉 and K ′ = 〈T ′ , D ′ 〉 being
rank equivalent means that, for every ranked interpretation R , R is a model of K iff it is a model of K ′ (see Section 2 ). In
turn, this implies that, given a countably inﬁnite domain , the set of models of K having  as domain corresponds to the
set of models of K ′ having  as domain ( R K 

= R K ′ 

). The latter implies that the characteristic model of the RC of K, R ∪ K , 
is also a characteristic model of the RC of K ′ , which suﬃces to conclude. 
In order to prove Proposition 20 , we need the following lemma. 
Lemma 34. An n-safe ELO ⊥ concept C is exceptional w.r.t. a safe ELO ⊥ ontology K = 〈T , D〉 iff the n-safe concept C 〈〉 is
exceptional w.r.t. the nominal safe EL 〈O〉 ⊥ ontology K 〈〉 = 〈T 〈〉 , D 〈〉 〉 . 
Proof. Assume C is not exceptional w.r.t. K . So, there is a ranked model R of K s.t. C R ∩ min ≺R (R )  = ∅ . Now, extend
the interpretation function · R of R imposing that for every a ∈ N O , 〈 a 〉 R = { a } R ; then R is model of K 〈〉 and C 〈〉 is not
exceptional, i.e. C R 〈〉 ∩ min ≺R (R )  = ∅ . 
For the other direction, assume C 〈〉 is not exceptional w.r.t. K 〈〉 . So, there is a model R of K 〈〉 s.t. C R 〈〉 ∩ min ≺R (R )  = ∅ .
Now, we build a ranked interpretation R ′ = 〈 R ′ , ·R ′ , ≺R ′ 〉 in the following way: 
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 • R 
′ = { x •D , x D | R | D  ⊥ , where D is a safe EL 〈O〉 ⊥ concept } ∪ { x 〈 a 〉 | a ∈ N O } ; 
• 〈 a 〉 R ′ = { x 〈 a 〉 ∈ R ′ } , for every defeasible nominal 〈 a 〉 ; 
• A R 
′ = { x D ∈ R ′ | R | D  A } ∪ { x •D ∈ R ′ | R | D  ∼A } ∪ { x 〈 a 〉 ∈ R ′ | R | 〈 a 〉  ∼A } , for every safe EL 〈O〉 ⊥ concept D , every
defeasible nominal 〈 a 〉 , and every atomic EL ⊥ concept A ; 
• r R 
′ = {〈 x D , x E 〉 ∈ R ′ × R ′ | R | D  ∃ r.E} ∪ {〈 x •D , x E 〉 ∈ R ′ × R ′ | R | D  ∼∃ r.E} ∪ {〈 x 〈 a 〉 , x E 〉 ∈ R ′ × R ′ | R | 〈 a 〉  ∼∃ r.E} , 
for every safe EL 〈O〉 ⊥ concepts D and E , and every defeasible nominal 〈 a 〉 ; 
• h R ′ (x •D ) = h R (D ) , for every x •D ∈ R 
′ 
; 
• h R ′ (x 〈 a 〉 ) = h R ( 〈 a 〉 ) , for every defeasible nominal 〈 a 〉 ; 
• x •D ≺R ′ x E for every x •D , x E ∈ R ′ . 
Note: using x • D we want to introduce an object that represents a typical instance of a concept D , while with x D we want
to represent an atypical instance of a concept D . Only for defeasible nominals we introduce a single object representing
them. What we need to impose in the interpretation R ′ is that every object x • D is more typical (is positioned in a lower layer)
than any atypical objects x E satisfying the concept D ; such a condition is easily satisﬁed if we impose the last constraint in
the above deﬁnition of R ′ : for every pair of concepts D and E , x •D ≺R ′ x E ; that is, we move all the objects x E , representing
an atypical occurrence of some concept E , to the upper layer. 
As next, we prove that R ′ is still a model of K 〈〉 . The ﬁrst step is to prove that for every pair of concepts D , E where D
and E are safe , we have, 
1. R D  E and R | D  ⊥ iff x D ∈ E R ′ ; 
2. R | D  ∼E and R | D  ⊥ iff x •D ∈ E R ′ . 
And, for every pair 〈 a 〉 , E where a ∈ N O and E is safe , we have, 
3. R | 〈 a 〉  ∼E iff x 〈 a 〉 ∈ E R ′ . 
The proofs are by induction on the construction of E . The only relevant steps are E = ∃ r.F (case a ) and E = ∃ r. 〈 b〉 (case
b ). 
1. 
a. If R D ∃ r . F and R | D  ⊥ then 
〈 x D , x F 〉 ∈ r R ′ . By induction hypothesis, x F ∈ F R ′ , hence x D ∈ (∃ r.F ) R ′ . Vice-versa, if x D ∈ (∃ r.F ) R ′ , then 〈 x D , x G 〉 ∈ r R ′ 
for some x G ∈ F R ′ . By construction, R | D  ⊥ , R D ∃ r . G , and by induction hypothesis, R G  F , hence R D ∃ r . F . 
b. If R D ∃ r . 〈 b 〉 and R | D  ⊥ then 〈 x D , x 〈 b〉 〉 ∈ r R ′ . Clearly x 〈 b〉 ∈ ( 〈 b〉 ) R ′ , and x D ∈ (∃ r. 〈 b〉 ) R ′ . Vice-versa, if x D ∈
(∃ r. 〈 b〉 ) R ′ , then 〈 x D , x 〈 b〉 〉 ∈ r R ′ and, by construction, R D ∃ r . 〈 b 〉 and R | D  ⊥ . 
2. 
a. If R | D  ∼∃ r.F and R | D  ⊥ then 〈 x •D , x F 〉 ∈ r R ′ . By induction point 1, x F ∈ F R ′ , and consequently x D ∈ (∃ r.F ) R ′ .
Vice-versa, if x •D ∈ (∃ r.F ) R ′ , then 〈 x •D , x G 〉 ∈ r R ′ for some x G ∈ F R ′ . By construction, R | D  ⊥ , R | D  ∼∃ r.G, and
by point 1, R G  F , hence R | D  ∼∃ r.F . 
b. If R | C  ∼∃ r. 〈 b〉 and R | D  ⊥ then 〈 x •D , x 〈 b〉 〉 ∈ r R ′ . By construction, x 〈 b〉 ∈ ( 〈 b〉 ) R ′ , hence x D ∈ (∃ r. 〈 b〉 ) R ′ . Vice-
versa, if x •D ∈ (∃ r. 〈 b〉 ) R ′ , then 〈 x •D , x 〈 b〉 〉 ∈ r R ′ , and, by construction, R | D  ∼∃ r. 〈 b〉 and R | D  ⊥ . 
3. Analogously to point 2. 
Now we prove that R ′ satisﬁes the safe EL 〈O〉 ⊥ ontology 〈T 〈〉 , D 〈〉 〉 : 
• Case D  E ∈ T 〈〉 . If x F ∈ D R 
′ 
, with F a safe concept, by point 1, R F  D , that, combined with R D  E , implies R F  E , and,
again by point 1, x F ∈ E R ′ . If x •F ∈ D R ′ , with F a safe concept, by point 2, R | F  ∼D, that, combined with R D  E , implies
R | F  ∼E, and, again by point 2, x F ∈ E R ′ . Eventually, if x 〈 a 〉 ∈ D R ′ , by point 3, R | 〈 a 〉  ∼D, that, combined with R D  E ,
implies R | 〈 a 〉  ∼E, and, again by point 3, x 〈 a 〉 ∈ E R ′ . 
• Case D 
 ∼E ∈ D 〈〉 . By construction of R ′ , for any F , it cannot be x F ∈ min ≺R ′ (D R 
′ 
) : only an object of kind x • F or x 〈 a 〉
can be in min ≺R ′ (D 
R ′ ) . If x •F ∈ min ≺R ′ (D R 
′ 
) then h R ′ (x •F ) = h R ′ (x •D ) , and by construction h R (F ) = h R (D ) . Also, by
point 2 R | F  ∼D . It can then be veriﬁed that h R (F ) = h R (D ) , R | F  ∼D and R | D  ∼E together imply that R | F  ∼E,
that by point 2 implies x •F ∈ E R ′ . Analogously, if x 〈 a 〉 ∈ min ≺R ′ (D R 
′ 
) then h R ′ (x 〈 a 〉 ) = h R ′ (x •D ) , and by construction
h R ( 〈 a 〉 ) = h R (D ) . Also, by point 3 R | 〈 a 〉  ∼D . Then it can be veriﬁed that h R ( 〈 a 〉 ) = h R (D ) , R | 〈 a 〉  ∼D and R | D  ∼E 
together imply that R | 〈 a 〉  ∼E, that by point 3 implies x 〈 a 〉 ∈ E R ′ . 
Therefore, the ranked interpretation R ′ is a model of 〈T 〈〉 , D 〈〉 〉 . Note that since we imposed that C 〈〉 is not exceptional in
R , in R ′ we have the object x C 〈〉 in layer 0, with x C 〈〉 ∈ (C 〈〉 ) R 
′ 
; hence C 〈〉 is not exceptional also in R ′ . 
Now we can trivially extend the interpretation R ′ to classical nominals: 
R ′ R ′ • { a } = 〈 a 〉 = { x 〈 a 〉 } for every a ∈ N O . 
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 It can easily be proved now that R ′ is also a model of K = 〈T , D〉 . To prove it, it is suﬃcient to check that for every
n-safe concept D and every object x , x ∈ D R ′ iff x ∈ (D {} ) R 
′ 
. This can be proved by induction on the construction of the
concept D ; the only relevant steps are 
• D = 〈 a 〉 . By construction, x ∈ 〈 a 〉 R ′ iff x ∈ { a } R ′ . 
• D = ∃ r. 〈 a 〉 . x ∈ (∃ r. 〈 a 〉 ) R ′ iff 〈 x, x 〈 a 〉 〉 ∈ r R ′ iff x ∈ (∃ r. { a } ) R ′ . 
Hence R ′ is a model of K . Since in Layer 0 we have x C 〈〉 , and x C 〈〉 ∈ (C 〈〉 ) R 
′ 
, we also have x C 〈〉 ∈ (C) R 
′ 
. That is, C R 
′ ∩
min ≺R ′ (
R ′ )  = ∅ , i.e. C is not exceptional in w.r.t. K . 
Now we can easily prove Proposition 20 . 
Proposition 20 . For every n-safe ELO ⊥ concept C and every nominal safe ELO ⊥ ontology K = 〈T , D〉 , r K (C) = i iff
r K 〈〉 (C 〈〉 ) = i . 
Proof. Consider a nominal safe ELO ⊥ ontology K = 〈T , D〉 and the nominal safe EL 〈O〉 ⊥ ontology K 〈〉 . Lemma 34 tells
us that for every safe ELO ⊥ GCI C  ∼D, C  ∼D is exceptional w.r.t. K iff C 〈〉 
 ∼D 〈〉 is exceptional w.r.t. K 〈〉 . Then we can easily
prove the proposition by induction on the construction of the ranking. 
Next, we address Proposition 21 . 
Proposition 21 . For every n-safe EL 〈O〉 ⊥ concept C and every nominal safe EL 〈O〉 ⊥ ontology K = 〈T , D〉 the following holds:
r K (C) = i iff r N(K {} ) (N(C {} )) = i . 
Proof. The proof of this proposition is quite immediate. Assume that there is a ranked interpretation R that is a model of K
and such that there is an object in layer 0 satisfying C . Now deﬁne an EL ⊥ ranked interpretation R ′ that is identical to R ,
by imposing that for every atomic concept N a , N a 
R ′ = 〈 a 〉 R . It is easy to check by induction on the construction of a concept
D that, for every object o ∈ R , o ∈ D R iff o ∈ (N(D {} )) R 
′ 
. Hence R ′ is a model of N(K {} ) and N ( C {} ) is not exceptional in R ′ .
Repeating exactly the same transformation and reasoning in the other direction, we can conclude that C is exceptional in K 
iff N ( C {} ) is exceptional in N(K {} ) . This property can be immediately extended to the deﬁnition of the rankings ( Section 2.2 ),
proving the proposition. 
Corollary 23 . Let K = 〈T , D〉 be a nominal safe EL 〈O〉 ⊥ ontology, with C  ∼D ∈ D . Let T • be the TBox obtained from K 
after applying RC.Step 1 , while let (N(T {} )) ∗ be the TBox obtained from N(K {} ) using the ComputeRanking procedure. Then, 
the following are equivalent: 
1. C 
 ∼⊥ ∈ T • ; 
2. N(C {} 
 ∼⊥ ) ∈ (N(T {} )) ∗ ; 
3. r K {} (C {} 
 ∼D {} ) = ∞ . 
Proof. The extension of Proposition 10 from EL ⊥ ontologies to EL 〈O〉 ⊥ ontologies is immediate: since defeasible nominals
behave exactly like atomic concepts, it is suﬃcient to go through the proof of Proposition 10 by taking into account also
defeasible nominals. This, combined with Proposition 21 , guarantees that the application of the above-mentioned procedures
gives back the same results for an EL 〈O〉 ⊥ ontology K and the correspondent ELO ⊥ ontology N(K {} ) . 
The following Lemma is needed to prove Proposition 24 . 
Lemma 35. Let K = 〈T , D〉 be a nominal safe EL 〈O〉 ⊥ ontology. Then N(T {} ∪ D  {} , ∞ ) is logically equivalent to (N(T {} )) ∗ (where
(N(T {} )) ∗ is deﬁned as in Corollary 23 ). 
Proof. From Proposition 21 we know that C 
 ∼D ∈ D {} , ∞ iff N(C 
 ∼D ) ∈ (N(D {} )) ∞ (that is, the axioms in D {} that have
inﬁnite rank w.r.t. K {} correspond to the axioms in N(D {} ) that have inﬁnite rank w.r.t. N(K {} ) ), hence N(T {} ∪ D  {} , ∞ ) is
the same as to N(T {} ) ∪ (N(D {} ))  ∞ . 
Now, we have to prove that N(T {} ) ∪ (N(D {} ))  ∞ is logically equivalent to (N(T {} )) ∗ . To this purpose, it is suﬃcient to
prove that every axiom in (N(D {} ))  ∞ is derivable from (N(T {} )) ∗ and every axiom in (N(T {} )) ∗ \ N(T {} ) is derivable from
N(T {} ) ∪ (N(D {} ))  ∞ . 
So, assume C  D ∈ (N(D {} ))  ∞ . Then C 
 ∼D ∈ (N(D {} )) ∞ . By procedure ComputeRanking , an axiom C ⊥ has been added
to (N(T {} )) ∗ \ N(T {} ) (line 13 of the procedure). If C  ⊥ ∈ (N(T {} )) ∗, then (N(T {} )) ∗ | C  D . 
Vice-versa, assume C  ⊥ ∈ (N(T {} )) ∗ \ N(T {} ) (due to line 13 of procedure ComputeRanking , only axioms with the form
C ⊥ can be in (N (T {} )) ∗ \ N (T {} ) ). This implies that an axiom C  ∼D is in (N(D {} )) ∞ (due to the construction of N(T {} )) ∗
in the line 13 of procedure ComputeRanking ), and so C  D ∈ (N(D {} ))  ∞ . By Proposition 10 , we know that C 
 ∼D ∈ (N(D {} )) ∞ 
iff it is in the ﬁxed point of the exceptionality procedure: that is, C 
 ∼D ∈ (N(D {} )) and 
(N(T {} )) | {¬ E unionsq F | E  ∼F ∈ (N(D {} )) ∞ }  ¬ C 
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 Since 
N(T {} ) ∪ (N(D {} ))  ∞ |   {¬ E unionsq F | E  ∼F ∈ (N(D {} )) ∞ } 
we end up with N(T {} ) ∪ (N(D {} ))  ∞ |   ¬ C, that is, 
N(T {} ) ∪ (N(D {} ))  ∞ | C  ⊥ 
for every C  ⊥ ∈ (N(T {} )) ∗ \ N(T {} ) , which concludes. 
Proposition 24 . Let K = 〈T , D〉 be a nominal safe EL 〈O〉 ⊥ ontology. For every safe GCI C  D , we have that the following are
equivalent: 
1. C  D is in the RC of K ; 
2. N ( C {}  D {} ) is in the RC of N(K {} ) ; 
3. T {} ∪ D  {} , ∞ | C {}  D {} . 
Proof. That C  D is in the RC of K iff N ( C {}  D {} ) is in the RC of N(K {} ) follows easily from Proposition 21 and from the fact
that RationalClosure is invariant to the substitution of every 〈 a 〉 with an atomic concept N a (it can be proven semantically
in a similar way as in the proof of Proposition 21 ). From Proposition 7 we know that N ( C {}  D {} ) is in the RC of N(K {} ) iff
(N(T {} )) ∗ | N(C {}  D {} ) , that, by Propositions 1 and 2 and Lemma 35 holds iff T {} ∪ D  {} , ∞ | C {}  D {} . 
References 
[1] A. Artale , D. Calvanese , R. Kontchakov , M. Zakharyaschev , The DL-Lite family and relations, . Artif. Intell. Res. 36 (2009) 1–69 . 
[2] F. Baader , B. Hollunder , Priorities on defaults with prerequisites, and their application in treating speciﬁcity in terminological default logic, J. Autom.
Reason. 15 (1995) 41–68 . 
[3] F. Baader , S. Brandt , C. Lutz , Pushing the EL envelope, in: In Proceedings of the 19th International Joint Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence (IJCAI-05),
Morgan-Kaufmann Publishers, Edinburgh, UK, 2005, pp. 364–369 . 
[4] P.A. Bonatti , C. Lutz , F. Wolter , The complexity of circumscription in description logic, J. Artif. Intell. Res. 35 (1) (2009) 717–773 . 
[5] P.A. Bonatti , M. Faella , L. Sauro , EL with default attributes and overriding, in: Proceedings of the 9th International Semantic Web Conference
(ISWC-10), volume 6496 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2010 . 64–79 
[6] P.A. Bonatti , M. Faella , L. Sauro , Adding default attributes to EL++, in: Proceedings of the 25th AAAI Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence (AAAI-11),
AAAI Press, 2011, pp. 171–176 . 
[7] P.A. Bonatti , M. Faella , L. Sauro , Defeasible inclusions in low-complexity DLs, J. Artif. Intell. Res. 42 (2011) 719–764 . 
[8] P.A. Bonatti , M. Faella , I. Petrova , L. Sauro , A new semantics for overriding in description logics, Artif. Intell. J. 222 (2015) 1–48 . 
[9] P.A. Bonatti , M. Faella , C. Lutz , L. Sauro , F. Wolter , Decidability of circumscribed description logics revisited, in: Advances in Knowledge Representation,
Logic Programming, and Abstract Argumentation - Essays Dedicated to Gerhard Brewka on the Occasion of His 60th Birthday, number 9060 in LNCS,
2015, pp. 112–124 . 
[10] K. Britz , J. Heidema , T. Meyer , Semantic preferential subsumption, in: J. Lang, G. Brewka (Eds.), Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on
Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR-08), AAAI Press/MIT Press, 2008 . 476–484 
[11] K. Britz , T. Meyer , I. Varzinczak , Semantic foundation for preferential description logics, in: D. Wang, M. Reynolds (Eds.), Proceedings of the 24th
Australasian Joint Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence (AI-11), number 7106 in LNAI, Springer, 2011 . 491–500 
[12] K. Britz, G. Casini, T. Meyer, K. Moodley, U. Sattler, I. Varzinczak, Rational Defeasible Reasoning for Description Logics, University of Cape Town, South
Africa, 2017 Technical report . https://tinyurl.com/yc55y7ts 
[13] G. Casini , U. Straccia , Rational closure for defeasible description logics, in: T. Janhunen, I. Niemelä (Eds.), Proceedings of the 12th European Conference
on Logics in Artiﬁcial Intelligence (JELIA-10), Number 6341 in LNCS, Springer-Verlag, 2010, pp. 77–90 . 
[14] G. Casini , U. Straccia , Defeasible inheritance-based description logics, J. Artif. Intell. Res. 48 (2013) 415–473 . 
[15] G. Casini , T. Meyer , K. Moodley , R. Nortjé, J. Leite , Relevant closure: a new form of defeasible reasoning for description logics, in: E. Fermé (Ed.),
Proceedings of the 14th European Conference on Logics in Artiﬁcial Intelligence (JELIA-14), volume 8761 of LNCS, Springer, 2014, pp. 92–106 . 
[16] G. Casini , U. Straccia , Lexicographic closure for defeasible description logics, in: Proceedings of the 8th Australasian Ontology Workshop (AOW), 969,
2014, pp. 4–15 . CEUR Workshop Proceedings 
[17] G. Casini , T.A. Meyer , K. Moodley , U. Sattler , I.J. Varzinczak , Introducing defeasibility into OWL ontologies, in: The Semantic Web - ISWC 2015 - 14th
International Semantic Web Conference, 2015 . Bethlehem, PA, USA, October 11-15, 2015, Proceedings, Part II, 409–426 
[18] G. Casini, U. Straccia, T. Meyer, A Polynomial Time Ssubsumption Algorithm for EL ⊥ Under Rational Closure, CNR Technical Report cnr.isti/2015-TR-044,
Italy, 2015 http://puma.isti.cnr.it/dfdownload.php?ident=/cnr.isti/2015- TR- 044langver=itscelta=Metadata 
[19] F.M. Donini , D. Nardi , R. Rosati , Description logics of minimal knowledge and negation as failure, ACM Trans. Comput. Logics 3 (2002) 177–225 . 
[20] T. Eiter , G. Ianni , T. Lukasiewicz , R. Schindlauer , Well-founded semantics for Description Logic programs in the Semantic Web, ACM Trans. Computat.
Logic 12 (2) (2011) 11:1–11:41 . 
[21] L. Giordano , V. Gliozzi , N. Olivetti , G.L. Pozzato , Prototypical reasoning with low complexity description logics: preliminary results, in: Proceedings
of the 10th International Conference on Logic Programming and Nonmonotonic Reasoning (LPNMR-09), volume 5753 of LNCS, Springer-Verlag, 2009,
pp. 430–436 . 
[22] L. Giordano , V. Gliozzi , N. Olivetti , G.L. Pozzato , ALC + T: a preferential extension of description logics, Fundam. Inform. 3 (96) (2009) 341–372 . 
[23] L. Giordano , V. Gliozzi , N. Olivetti , G.L. Pozzato , Preferential vs rational description logics: which one for reasoning about typicality? in: 19th European
Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence (ECAI-10), volume 215 of Frontiers in Artiﬁcial Intelligence and Applications, IOS Press, 2010, pp. 1069–1070 . 
[24] L. Giordano , V. Gliozzi , N. Olivetti , G.L. Pozzato , Reasoning about typicality in low complexity DLs: The logics EL ⊥ t min and DL-Lite c t min , in: Proceedings
of the 22nd International Joint Conference on Artiﬁcial intelligence (IJCAI-11), IJCAI/AAAI, 2011, pp. 894–899 . 
[25] L. Giordano , V. Gliozzi , N. Olivetti , G.L. Pozzato , A tableau calculus for a nonmonotonic extension of EL ⊥ , in: 20th International Conference on
Automated Reasoning with Analytic Tableaux and Related Methods (TABLEAUX-11), volume 6763 of LNCS , Springer Verlag, 2011, pp. 180–195 . 
[26] L. Giordano , N. Olivetti , V. Gliozzi , G.L. Pozzato , A minimal model semantics for nonmonotonic reasoning, in: L.F.n. del Cerro, A. Herzig, J. Mengin
(Eds.), Proceedings of the 13th European Conference on Logics in Artiﬁcial Intelligence (JELIA-12), Number 7519 in LNCS, Springer, 2012, pp. 228–241 .
[27] L. Giordano , V. Gliozzi , N. Olivetti , G.L. Pozzato , A non-monotonic description logic for 933 reasoning about typicality, Artif. Intell. J. 195 (2013)
165–202 . 
[28] L. Giordano , V. Gliozzi , N. Olivetti , Towards a rational closure for expressive description logics: the case of SHQ, Fundam. Inform. 159 (1–2) (2018)
95–122 . 
[29] L. Giordano , V. Gliozzi , N. Olivetti , G.L. Pozzato , Semantic characterization of rational closure: From propositional logic to description logics, Artif. Intell.
J. 226 (2015) 1–33 . 
620 G. Casini et al. / Information Sciences 501 (2019) 588–620 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 [30] L. Giordano , D.T. Dupré, Defeasible reasoning in SROEL: from rational entailment to rational closure, Fundam. Inform. 161 (1–2) (2018) 135–161 . 
[31] S. Grimm , P. Hitzler , A preferential tableaux calculus for circumscriptive ALCO , in: Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Web Reasoning
and Rule Systems (RR-09), volume 5837 of LNCS, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2009, pp. 40–54 . 
[32] J.F. Horty , Some direct theories of nonmonotonic inheritance, in: Handbook of Logic in Artiﬁcial Intelligence and Logic Programming: Nonmonotonic
Reasoning and Uncertain Reasoning, 3, Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 111–187 . 
[33] V. Ivanov , M. Knorr , J. Leite , A query tool for EL with non-monotonic rules, in: The Semantic Web - ISWC 2013 - 12th International Semantic Web
Conference, Part I, volume 8218 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer Verlag, 2013, pp. 216–231 . 
[34] T. Kaminski , M. Knorr , J. Leite , Eﬃcient paraconsistent reasoning with ontologies and rules, in: Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint
Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence, IJCAI-15, AAAI Press, 2015, pp. 3098–3105 . 
[35] Y. Kazakov , M. Krötzsch , F. Simancik , The incredible ELK - from polynomial procedures to eﬃcient reasoning with EL ontologies, J. Autom. Reason.
53 (1) (2014) 1–61 . 
[36] M. Knorr , J.J. Alferes , P. Hitzler , Local closed world reasoning with description logics under the well-founded semantics, Artif. Intell. 175 (9–10) (2011)
1528–1554 . 
[37] S. Kraus , D. Lehmann , M. Magidor , Nonmonotonic reasoning, preferential models and cumulative logics, Artif. Intell. J. 44 (1990) 167–207 . 
[38] M. Krötzsch , Eﬃcient inferencing for OWL EL, in: In 12th European Conference on Logics in Artiﬁcial Intelligence (JELIA-10), volume 6341 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, 2010, pp. 234–246 . 
[39] M. Krötzsch , S. Rudolph , P. Hitzler , Complexities of Horn description logics, ACM Trans. Comput. Logic 14 (1) (2013) . 2 
[40] D. Lehmann , M. Magidor , What does a conditional knowledge base entail? Artif. Intell. J. 55 (1992) 1–60 . 
[41] D. Lehmann , Another perspective on default reasoning, Ann. Math. Artif. Intell. 15 (1) (1995) 61–82 . 
[42] T. Lukasiewicz , Tractable probabilistic description logic programs, in: First International Conference on Scalable Uncertainty Management (SUM-07),
volume 4772 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer Verlag, 2007 . 143–156 
[43] T. Lukasiewicz , U. Straccia , Tightly coupled fuzzy description logic programs under the answer set semantics for the semantic web, International
Journal on Semantic Web and Information Systems 4 (3) (2008) 68–89 . 
[44] T. Lukasiewicz , U. Straccia , Description logic programs under probabilistic uncertainty and fuzzy vagueness, Int. J. Approx. Reason. 50 (6) (2009)
837–853 . 
[45] D. Makinson , General patterns in nonmonotonic reasoning, in: D.M. Gabbay, C.J. Hogger, J.A. Robinson (Eds.), Handbook of Logic in Artiﬁcial Intelligence
and Logic Programming (Vol. 3), Oxford University Press, Inc., New York, NY, USA, 1994, pp. 35–110 . 
[46] K. Moodley, Practical reasoning for defeasible description logics, 2015, Ph.D Thesis, University of KwaZulu-Natal, School of Mathematics, Statistics and
Computer Science, South Africa. 
[47] B. Motik , R. Rosati , Reconciling description logics and rules, J. ACM 57 (5) (2010) . 
[48] M. Pensel , A.Y. Turhan , Including quantiﬁcation in defeasible reasoning for the description logic EL ⊥ , in: M. Balduccini, T. Janhunen (Eds.), Logic
Programming and Nonmonotonic Reasoning - 14th International Conference, LPNMR 2017, Espoo, Finland, July 3-6, 2017, Proceedings, volume 10377
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer, 2017, pp. 78–84 . 
[49] M. Pensel , A.Y. Turhan , Reasoning in the defeasible description logic EL ⊥ - computing standard inferences under rational and relevant semantics, Int.
J. Approx. Reason 103 (2018) (2018) 28–70 . 
[50] U. Straccia , Default inheritance reasoning in hybrid KL-ONE-style logics, in: Proceedings of th 13th International Joint Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelli-
gence (IJCAI-93), 1993, pp. 676–681 . Chambery, France 
